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The President is vitally interested in developing national energy self
sufficiency, and views acceleration in offshore leasing as an integral
part of his economic recovery program. J
James G. Watt, Secretary of
the Interior, 1981-83.
INTRODUCTION

The development of outer continental shelf (OCS) oil and gas re
sources has raised recurring problems in federal-state relations. 2 The
I. OCS Oversight-Part 2: Hearings 011 OCS Oversight and Related Issues, the
National OCS Program and the Five- Year OCS Leasing Program Before the Subcomm. on
the Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1981) [hereinafter OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2]
(statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior).
2. See Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf Mineral
Resources, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1107 (1976); Galloway & Nixon, The Newest Federalism and
Coastal Areas, 25 OCEANUS 3 (1982). For discussions on federalism and natural resource
development, see generally Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce
Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71 (1980); Ball, Good Old American
Permits: Madisonian Federalism on the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf, 12 ENVTL.
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problems raised concern matters such as how, when, and in what manL. 623 (1982); Berg, Management ofPacific Ocean Salmon Ranching: A Problem ofFeder
alism in the Coastal Zone, 9 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 41 (1981); Berg, Private Ocean
Ranching of Pacific Salmon and Fishery Management: A Problem of Federalism, 12
ENVTL. L. 81 (1981); FIorini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Coopera
tion or Confusion?, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (1982); Greenberg & Shapiro, Federalism
in the Fishery Conservation Zone: A New Role for the States in An Era of Federal Regula
tory Reform, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 641 (1982); Kanouse, Achieving Federalism in the Regula
•tion of Coastal Energy Facility Siting, 8 EcOLOGY L.Q. 533 (1980); MacRae, The Fishery
Conservation and Management Act: The States' Role in Domestic and International Fishery
Management, 88 DICK. L. REV. 306 (1984); Mills & Woodson, Energy Policy: A Test for
Federalism, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 405 (1976); Moull, Natural Resources: The Other Crisis in
Canadian Federalism, 18 OSGOODE HALL L.J. I (1980); Rogalski, The Unique Federalism
of the Regional Councils Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 9
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 163 (1980); Schoenbaum & Parker, Federalism in the Coastal
Zone: Three Models ofState Jurisdiction and Control, 57 N.CL. REv. 231 (1979); Skillern,
Constitutional and Statutory Issues of Federalism in the Development of Energy Resources,
17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 533 (1985); Squillace, Cooperative Federalism Under the Sur
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Is This Any Way to Run A Government?, 87 W.
VA. L. REV. 687 (1985); Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications for
State Control of Natural Resources, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 601 (1982).
Since the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, the federal government, as part of a national
policy to achieve energy self-sufficiency, has supported programs to increase the production
of domestic energy resources, particularly the large quantities of fossil fuels located in the
western United States. Hall, White & Ballard, Western States and National Energy Policy,
22 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 191 (1978) [hereinafter Hall]. For example, President
Carter proposed the creation of an Energy Mobilization Board (EMB) in his July 15, 1979
energy address to the nation. The EMB would be empowered to expedite decision making
of federal, state, and local agencies of priority energy projects. Comment, The Energy Mo
bilization Board, 8 EcOLOGY L.Q. 727, 727(1980) [hereinafter The Energy Mobilization
Board]. The expediting process, often referred to as "fast tracking," raised significant con
stitutional problems. The difficulty with "fast tracking" was the attempt to dictate to the
states and local governments the means by which those entities should discharge their dele
gated functions. Fischer, Allocating Decisionmaking in the Field ofEnergy Resource Devel
opment: Some Questions and Suggestions, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 863-64 (1980). "Fast
tracking" would have resulted in the imposition of federal controls over basic state and
local government decisionmaking concerning the selection, approval, and licensing of des
ignated priority energy projects. State and local government decisionmaking powers and
approval processes would be subject to preemption by the EMB. Fischer, supra, at 848.
Western states were also concerned that such legislation would transfer the control of water
availability from them to the EMB and eventually result in federal control of a traditional
local resource. Fischer, supra, at 831. Congress rejected President Carter's EMB proposal
because of concerns that the EMB would encroach upon states' rights. The Energy Mobili
zation Board, supra, at 747.
These policies have affected federal-state relations, and some western states have ar
gued for a larger role in national decisionmaking in energy, environmental, and natural
resource areas. Hall, supra, at 191-92. For discussions on federal-state relationships and
resource development, see generally Engdahl, Some Observations on State and Federal Con
trol of Natural Resources, 15 Hous. L. REV..1201 (1978); Engdahl, State and Federal
Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283 (1976); Grainey, Energy Conservation:
The Federal-State Nexus, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 611 (1978); Harvey, Federal-State Relation
ships in Federal Land and Resource Management, 54 DEN. L.J. 585 (1977); Huffman, Gov
erning America's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12 ENVTL. L. 863 (1982); Leman &
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ner OCS petroleum resources should be developed to satisfy national
energy requirements. 3 National plans.to increase oil a'nd gas produc
tion on the OCS have provoked conflict between coastal states and the
federal government for the last decade. 4
Coastal states are concerned over both the development of OCS
energy resources within their coastal areas, 5 and the federal govern
ment's failure to develop a comprehensive national energy plan. 6 A
consequence of that failure is that one resource may be favored for·
expedited development over other resources. 7 Furthermore, the OCS
leasing program will be largely determined by national policies set by
Nelson, The Rise of Managerial Federalism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, 12
ENVTL. L. 981 (1982); Lyons, Federalism and Resource Development: A New Role for
States?, 12 ENVTL. L. 931 (1982); Shapiro, Energy Development on the Public Domain:

Federal/State Cooperation and Conflict Regarding Environmental Land Use Control, 9
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 397 (1976); Thomas, The Cape Cod National Seashore: A Case
Study of Federal Administrative Control Over Traditionally Local Land Use Decisions, 12
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 225 (1985); White &.Barry, Energy Development in the West:
Conflict and Coordination of Governmental Decision-Making, 52 N.D.L. REV. 451 (1976);
Comment, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 817 (1980); Note, Federal-State Conflict in Energy Development: An Illustration, 53
DEN. L.J. 521 (1976); Comment, Federal and State Cooperation in the Management of
Public Lands, 5 J. CONTEMP. L. 149 (1978); Comment, State and Local Control ofEnergy
Development on Federal Lands, 32 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1980).
3. Breeden, supra note 2, at 1I08; Skillern, supra note 2, at 534.
4. OCS Five-Year Development Plan: Hearing on the Department of the Interior's
Recommendations for this Nation's Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program
for the Next Five Years Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelfof
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1987)
[hereinafter Hearing on OCS Five-Year Dev. Plan] (statement of Representative W.J. (Billy)
Tauzin of Louisiana); Five Year OCS Leasing Schedule: Hearing on the Status of the Cur
rent Five- Year Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Schedule, the Pace of the Leasing Schedule,
and Other OCS-Related Issues Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal/Outer Continental
Shelfofthe House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98tli Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984)
[hereinafter Hearing on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Schedule]; STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM.
ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSU
LAR AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., A REPORT ON THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
JAMES G. WATT'S FIVE YEAR OIL AND GAS LEASING PLAN FOR THE OUTER CONTINEN
TAL SHELF I (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE
YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN].
5. See generally Hunt, Introduction: Offshore Oil and Gas-Past, Present, Future, 26
OCEANUS 3 (1983); Note, "Not on My Beach':' Local California Initiatives to Prevent On
shore Support Facilities for Offshore Oil Development, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1987).
6. National Energy Policies Should Improve While Oil Market Depressed, Oil & Gas
J., Mar. 31, 1986, at 41; Energy Policy in the
Still Failing Due to Faulty Premises, Oil &
Gas J., Mar. 17, 1986, at 41; Industry Should Seek Sound
Energy Policy, Not Oil
Import Levy, Oil & Gas J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 55;
Nonenergy Policies Undermine Energy
Policy's Market Emphasis, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 39; Energy Plan Needed Now,
Offshore, May 1985, at 97; DOE, Interior Merger Could Strengthen
Energy Policy, Oil
& Gas J., Jan. 28, 1985, at 55.
7. Skillern, supra note 2, at 534-35.

u.s.

u.s.

u.s.

u.s.
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the federal government, but the development of OCS oil and gas
reserves will have a severe impact on the states. 8 Coastal states must
respond to the "boomtown" effects from OCS energy development. 9
The states must assume the costs of providing a proper infrastruc
ture-new housing, schools, roads, and expanded municipal serv
ices-in those areas impacted by offshore oil development. \0
To accelerate the development of the nation's OCS energy
resources, the Reagan administration approved two OCS leasing pro
grams l l that go far beyond the leasing schedules of every administra
tion from President Eisenhower, when OCS leasing began, to
President Carter.12 The first leasing program, developed by Secretary
Watt, covered the five-year period from August 1982 to June 1987.13
The second program, prepared by Secretary Hodel, extends from mid
1987 to mid-1992.14
Development of OCS resources, however, presents numerous en
vironmental, economic, and political concerns. 15 "No other region in
our country is subject to so many urgent demands from powerful con
8. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55, 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1450, 1496 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 590]. See also Hall, supra
note 2, at 191.
9. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1496. See also Skillern, supra note 2, at 535.
10. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1462. See also Skillern, supra note 2, at 535.
11. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments require the Secretary of
the Interior to prepare a five-year plan for oil and gas leasing indicating the size, timing,
and location of leasing activity which the Secretary determines will best meet national en
ergy needs. 43 U.S.c. § 1344 (1982).

12. Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the Department of the Interior's Five
Year Leasing Plan-Part J: Hearings on Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the De
partment of the Interior's Five-Year Leasing Plan Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations and the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining ofthe House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 513 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings on OCS Lease
Sales-Part J].
13. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 1 FINAL SUP
PLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENT IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED FIVE-YEAR
OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE SCHEDULE, JANUARY 1982-DECEMBER 1986 (1981)
[hereinafter 1 FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE]; HOUSE
REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
14. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED FI
NAL FIVE-YEAR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM MID
1987 TO MID-1992 (1987) [hereinafter PROPOSED FINAL FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PRO
GRAM 1987-1992]; Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release: Inte
rior Department Releases Proposed Five- Year Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing Program (Apr.
27,1987) [hereinafter
Dep't of the Interior News Release, Apr. 27,1987]'
15. Hunt, supra note 5, at 8.

u.s.
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fticting interests as the coastal area."16 More than 50% of the popula
tion of the United States currently lives within fifty miles of the
country's coasts or the shores of the Great Lakes, and it is estimated
that by the year 2000, 80% of our population may live in this areaP
The space available for that increased population will not change sig
nificantly in the next twenty years. The coastal zone will experience
competitive demands for that limited space from commercial, residen
tial, recreational, and other development interests which must be bal
anced against the impact on the scenic beauty and delicate ecological
systems of the coastal zone. IS
Coastal states are willing to contribute to national energy self
sufficiency and are not unalterably opposed to OCS leasing off their
shores. 19 However, they are concerned about the potential impacts an
accelerated program would have on their coastal areas, and they fear
that their interests may be overlooked by federal officials during the
development of short-term energy policy.20 The implementation of an
accelerated OCS oil and gas program has been a subject of controversy
since 1974 when President Nixon directed the Secretary of the Interior
to triple, from three million to ten million acres a year, OCS acreage
16. Kuersteiner, Sullivan & Temin, Protecting Our Coastal Interests: A Policy for
Coordinating Coastal Zone Management. National Defense and the Federal Supremacy
Doctrine, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 705 (1980).
17. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 4776, 4777 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 753].
18. See S. REP. No. 753, supra note 17, at 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 4777. The significance of the coastal zone and the competition among users
within the area is described in a government report:
The coast of the United States is, in many respects, the Nation's most valua
ble geographic feature. It is at the juncture of the land and sea that the great part
of this Nation's trade and industry takes place. The waters off the shore are
among the most biologically productive regions of the Nation.
The uses of valuable coastal areas generate issues of intense State and local
interest, but the effectiveness with which the resources of the coastal zone are
used and protected often is a matter of national importance. Navigation and mili
tary uses of the coasts and waters offshore clearly are direct Federal responsibili
ties: economic development, recreation, and conservation interests are shared by
the Federal Government and the States.
Rapidly intensifying use of coastal areas already has outrun the capabilities
of local governments to plan their orderly development and to resolve conflicts.
The division of responsibilities among the several levels of government is unclear,
and the knowledge and procedures for formulating sound decisions are lacking.
S. REP. No. 753, supra note 17, at 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS
4778.
19. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR DCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 42.
20. Id.
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under lease. 21
Many of these controversies have continued with the implementa
tion of Reagan administration policies and were particularly height
ened under the tenure of Secretary Watt. 22 The offshore oil and gas
leasing program initiated by the Reagan administration was the most
ambitious and controversial energy development program in the na
tion's history. Issues such as the pace and timing of lease sales,con
sultation and coordination with state and local governments and
interested parties, prelease consistency,23 areawide leasing, fair market
value, and leasing moratoria have become major obstacles to the full
implementation of an accelerated OCS oil and gas program. These
issues predominantly emerged following the inauguration of President
Reagan in 198124 and are the focus of this study.
Accordingly, Part I examines the policy rationale for Secretary
Watt's accelerated leasing program. 25 Part II examines the issues
raised by opponents to the Secretary's approach including the coastal
states' ability to cope with the onshore effects of increased offshore
leasing,26 questions about the DOl's ability to manage an increased
leasing schedule27 and about the petroleum industry's ability to in
crease OCS exploration,28 and concerns about the Reagan administra
tion's commitment to protecting the coastal environment. 29 Part II
also examines additional environmental concerns raised by areawide
leasing 30 and discusses whether areawide leasing precludes receipt of
fair market value for the public resources being sold. 31 Part III exam
ines the phenomenon of piecemeal leasing moratoria,32 the congres
sional response to Secretary Watt's accelerated leasing schedule.
Finally, Part IV examines Secretary Watt's implementation of the
areawide leasing concept. 33
21. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 100, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1506-07.
22. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 1, 36, 42-49.
23. Hearing on the Five- Year oes Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 46 (statement of
Representative Young of Alaska).
24. Id.
25. See infra notes 34-101 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 110-46 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 182-219 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 220-97 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 298-368 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 369-422 and accompanying text.
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THE W A Tr FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PROGRAM OF

1982-87

AND ASSOCIATED POLICIES
To accelerate the development of the nation's offshore energy po
tential, Secretary of the Interior James Watt, on July

21, 1982,

ap

proved a leasing schedule that offered almost the entire OCS for
exploration and development. 34 This schedule replaced the June,

1980

final leasing schedule approved during the Carter administration by
Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus. 35 The Watt program offered for lease
nearly one billion acres of federal OCS lands during the five year pe
riod from August 1982 to June 1?87, compared to fifty-five million
acres under the Andrus proposal. 36 This amounted to twenty times as
34. Minerals Management Serv., U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release I (July 21,
1982) [hereinafter News Release (July 21, 1982)]; Final Five-Year Plan for Oil and Gas
Development in the Outer Continental Shelf: Hearings to Review the Secretary of the Inte
rior's Proposed Five- Year Plan for Oil and Gas Development in the Outer Continental Shelf
Pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 Before the Sub
comm. on Energy Conservation and Supply of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1982) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on the Five- Year OCS
Leasing Plan] (statement of Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut).
The offshore leasing plan became final in July, 1982, after 19 months of consultation
between the Department of the Interior and 23 affected states. The administrative record
contains over 5000 pages and reflects participation by local governments, environmental
groups, industry, and the public. The effort was described by Secretary Watt as "the most
comprehensive, exhaustive project in the [Interior] Department's history." Senate Hear
ings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra, at 9 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary
of the Interior); News Release (July 21, 1982), supra.
With Congress unwilling to seriously consider legislation to abolish the Energy De
partment or hasten decontrol of natural gas prices, Secretary Watt's controversial program
to rapidly accelerate the pace of federal OCS leasing was especially important. Watt's pro
gram was the only active energy policy proposal during the first term of the Reagan admin
istration. A Quiet Point Man for Oil Leasing, Bus. WK. 75 (Aug. 30, 1982).
35. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 5-6; Vass, A Comparison ofAmerican and British Offshore Oil Development Dur
ing the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations. Part 1,21 TULSA L.J. 23, 59-60 (1985)' [here
inafter Vass 1].
Changes in the leasing schedule are authorized by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 630 (codified as amended in scat
tered sections of 16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.c., 42 U.S.c., 43 U.S. C.). The Secretary of the Interior
is charged with reviewing and periodically revising the OCS leasing program. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1344(a) (1982).
36. 'News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 1,4. See Senate Hearings on the
Five- Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 14 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of
the Interior). The exact size of the United States outer continental shelf has not been estab
lished. Area estimates provided by the Department of the Interior range from about 800
million to over one billion acres. OCS Oversight-Part 1: Hearings on Provisions of the
OCSLA Concerning Interrelationships of Federal and State Governments in the Decision
making Process and the Importance of the oes on the Coastal Zone Before the Subcomm.
on the Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1981) [hereinafter OCS Oversight Hearings-Part
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much acreage as was offered under the Andrus plan, and twenty-five
times as much as was offered during the entire period from 1954, when
the program began, to 1980. 37
The Watt program scheduled forty-one lease sales over the five
year period from 1982 to 1987. One billion acres, divided into eight
een planning areas ranging in size from 8 million to 133 million acres,
were considered for leasing. In coritrast, prior lease sales covered
about two million acres. 38 One-half of the acreage offered was In
Alaska's OCS.39
Secretary Watt maintained that accelerating offshore leasing in
frontier OCS areas, such as Alaska, was in the national interest. 40 He
claimed that the program "will enhance ... national security, provide
1]. For the purpose of this study, a reasonable estimate of the federal OCS areas out to a
depth of 2500 meters is about one billion acres (965.8 million acres). COMPTROLLER GEN
ERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. EMD 81-59, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS, ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS FOR OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 3-4
(1981) [hereinafter ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS]. "This area is equal in size to
roughly half the U.S. land mass." HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS
LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 6 n.19. Submerged lands under state jurisdiction are esti
mated to total an additional 32.7 million acres. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS,
supra, at 3.
37. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 1 (state
ment of Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut); HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S
FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 6.
38. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 4. Twelve sales were scheduled in
the Gulf of Mexico, 16 in offshore Alaska, four in California, and eight in the Atlantic.
One reoffering sale was scheduled to reoffer all of the unleased tracts. News Release (July
21, 1982), supra note 34, at 4. The final leasing program approved by Secretary Andrus in
June 1980, scheduled 36 sales over the five-year period 1980 through 1985. Eleven sales
were scheduled off the Gulf of Mexico, six in the Atlantic, four off California, and 10 in
offshore Alaska. Five reoffering sales were also scheduled. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY
WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 5.
39. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 21 (state
ment of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior).
40. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release (Apr. 16, 1981)
[hereinafter News Release (Apr. 16, 1981)]. Secretary Watt explained the need to expedite
leasing in high potential offshore areas in the following manner:
Much of America's untapped petroleum resource may lie offshore in frontier
areas which have never been explored. To help reduce our dependence on costly
and uncertain foreign oil, we must inventory the lands subject to Federal control
in order to determine the value of the resources which may be hidden within
them. To do so we must facilitate exploration and development in those areas
with potential resource value. The proposal which is being announced today is
designed to achieve these goals while preserving sound environmental safeguards.
The program we are proposing will make more acreage available for leasing,
will cut substantially the time now required to start leasing in promising frontier
areas, and will use the market mechanism rather than arbitrary government deci
sions in selecting areas for lease and exploration.
By improving leasing procedures and eliminating administrative bottlenecks,
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jobs, and protect the environment while making America less depen
dent on foreign oil sources."41 According to Secretary Watt, his OCS
lease schedule would improve the efficiency of the OCS leasing pro
gram and increase the availability to the United States of critical off
shore energy resources. The Secretary outlined the major objectives of
the revised OCS program as including: (1) a substantial increase in
the rate of OCS leasing; (2) early lease sales of frontier areas with high
oil and gas potential; (3) streamlining the OCS program to shorten the
presale planning process including telescoping, areawide environmen
tal analysis, and tiering of National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) assessments.42 The main thrust of the program was to accel
erate the rate of OCS lease sales. 43
we can speed leasing while at the same time maintaining careful protection of
environmental values.

Id.
41. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 1. James Edwards, Energy Secre
tary, hailed the decision to accelerate the pace of offshore oil and gas leasing on the OCS:
America is and for many years in the future will continue to be heavily de
pendent upon petroleum. Conservation can help, and is helping, but conservation
is not the total answer. What we desperately need-and what has been lacking in
recent times-is a determination and commitment to find and put into production
the petroleum resources that America has.
The President believes that we can restore our capabilities to produce enough
energy domestically so that we are not vulnerable to unreasonable price increases
or political blackmail by major oil producing countries or their cartels. We live in
an interdependent world, but that does not mean that we can afford to become
dangerously dependent upon other nations-sometimes unfriendly nations-for
the essential elements of our economy.
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release 1 (Apr. 10, 1981) [hereinafter News Release (Apr.
10, 1981)] (quoting James Edwards, Energy Secretary).
42. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). In a statement by Secretary Watt before the House Sub
committee, he explained that the revised OCS program would consist of the following:
First, there will be greater emphasis on early entry into areas of high poten
tial. Here we are talking about the frontier areas of offshore Alaska. We are
proposing earlier offerings of four of the five high-potential basins involved.
Second, we propose early reentry into high-potential areas. Spacing between
first and second offerings is being decreased from 3 years to 2 years.
Third, we are streamlining the OCS leasing program. This includes propos
als for a general reduction in the time needed to hold a lease sale, area-wide envi
ronmental and hydrocarbon resource assessments, tiering of NEPA documents,
larger lease offerings. and more efficient methods for assuring receipt of fair mar
ket value.
The key is streamlining the program, including earlier opening of areas with
high potential.
Id. The National Environmental Policy Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
43. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, News Release 1 (July IS, 1981)
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Although the Reagan administration's decision to speed up off
shore leasing was not the first time the OCS program has been acceler
ated as part of a national energy program,44 the OCS leasing program
approved by Secretary Watt was a dramatic departure from past lease
schedules. 45 While the number of OCS lease sales did not significantly
increase, rising from thirty-six to forty-one during the five year period,
the number of acres offered for leasing rose dramatically. For exam
ple, the average sale made by Secretary Andrus was 900,000 acres;
under Secretary Watt's plan the average sale was about twenty-four
million acres. 46 Under the Watt accelerated leasing schedule, the Inte
rior Department reviewed almost the entire federal OCS- about one
billion acres-for oil and gas leasing during 1982-87. 47 In contrast,
from 1954 through 1980, only forty-one million acres of federal off
shore lands were offered for lease and less than half, about nineteen
million acres, were actually leased. 48 The most OCS acreage ever
leased in one year was 1.8 million acres in 1979. 49
[hereinafter News Release (July 15, 1981)], This news release is reprinted in Hearings on
12, at 572-76.
44. In response to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74, President Nixon announced
"Project Independence," a plan by which the United States would seek to become energy
self-sufficient by 1980. In April 1973, the President directed the Secretary of the Interior to
triple, from one million to three million acres a year,
acreage under lease. In January
1974, President Nixon instructed the Interior Department to further accelerate the pace of
OCS leasing from three million to 10 million acres, another tripling of the OCS leasing goal
in less than one year. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 100, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1506-07; Comment, Onshore Impacts o/Offshore Drilling:
The Police Power Alternative, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 967 (1976). Some commentators, however,
argue that energy independence is an unattainable national goal. See Debating Self-Suffi
ciency, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 49. For an informative discussion of United States
energy policy since World War II, see Goodwin, Energy: 1945-1980, 5 WILSON Q. 55
(1981).
45. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 1.
46. SIERRA CLUB, THE GREAT GIVEAWAY: PUBLIC OIL, GAS, AND COAL AND
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 6 (1982).
47. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATf'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 6. "One or more times during the five-year period, all the tracts in each of the 18
Outer Continental Shelf planning areas ... [were] offered for lease, excepting tracts elimi
nated for environmental reasons and to accommodate other uses." News Release (July 15,
1981), supra note 43, at 1. While the Interior Department offered almost one billion OCS
acres for oil and gas leasing, Secretary Watt actually hoped to annually lease between five
and twelve million acres.
48. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 36, at 22.
49. OFFSHORE INFORMATION & PUBLICATIONS, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OCS REPORT MMS 89-0058, FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATIS
TICS: 1987, LEASING, EXPLORATION, PRODUCTION & REVENUES 12 (1989) [hereinafter
1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS].

oes Lease Sales-Part 1, supra note

oes
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Not only did the acreage for each sale increase under the Watt
plan, but the total annual acreage offered also increased. Past annual
offerings ranged from 1.8 million acres in 1977 to 7.7 million acres in
1981. However, 1983 total offerings were approximately 120 million
acres and a record 154 million acres were offered in 1984. 50
The average annual OCS acreage offered and leased had been
modest. From 1971 through 1980, about 2.9 million acres of OCS
lands were offered for lease and approximately 1.2 million acres were
leased. 5 I Table 1 shows the total number of OCS acres offered and
leased from 1954 through 1987.
Despite the optimistic appraisal of the energy resource potential
of OCS lands, in 1980, only one percent of all.outer continental shelf
acreage was under lease, only 2 % had ever been leased, and less than
4% had ever been offered for lease. 52 The Reagan administration
maintained that the only way to determine accurately the amount of
recoverable oil and gas in the OCS was to accelerate exploratory drill
ing in the nation's offshore regions. 53 Thus, accelerated leasing would
aid in inventorying the wealth of the United States OCS as rapidly as
possible. 54
50. Id. at 12.
51. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 36, at 30.
52. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of W. Kenneth
Davis, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Energy). Of nearly one billion acres of federal OCS
lands, only 45 million were under lease as of December 31, 1987. 1987 FEDERAL OFF
SHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 12.
53. Offshore Leasing: Department ofthe Interior Oversight: Hearings Before the Sub
comm. on Environment. Energy. and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Govern
ment Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 513-14 (1981) [hereinafter Offshore Leasing
Hearings] (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Secretary Watt stated:
The peoples of a land cannot understand their resource wealth until the re
sources have been inventoried and their value and extent is known. With all of
America's greatness, we still do not understand our own wealth. We must inven
tory our lands.
Today we do not know the full extent of our mineral values, our agricultural
potential, or our oil and gas reserves. Unfortunately, the only way at this time to
inventory our lands to determine the qualities of oil and gas is to drill. Once we
have inventoried the lands, we can then make wise decisions with regard to the
aIlocation of wealth that is resident in the land.
Id.
The petroleum industry supports the Reagan administration's efforts to inventory
United States offshore hydrocarbon resources. Accelerated OCS Leasing A Key to Vital
Assessment of u.s. Resources, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 2, 1982, at 45 [hereinafter Accelerated
OCS Leasing A Key to Vital Assessment of u.s. Resources]. Congress has declared that
"there is a serious lack of adequate basic energy information ... with respect to the availa
bility of oil and natural gas from the Outer Continental Shelf." 43 U.S.C. § 1865(a)(I)
(1982).
54. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 55 (statement of James G.
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OCS ACREAGE OFFERED AND LEASED

1954-87

(million acres)·

Year

1954
1955
1959
1960
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

Offered
(million acres)·

1.4
0.7
0.5
1.6
3.7
0.7
1.1

0.9
0.3
1.0
1.3
0.3
0.7
0.1
1.0
1.5
5.0
7.2
2.8
1.8
3.1
3.4
2.6
7.7
7.6
119.8
154.4
87.0
58.7
59.8

Leased
(million acres)·

0.5
0.4
0.2
0.7
1.9
0.3
0.6
0.1
0.1
0.7
0.9
0.1
0.6
0.0
0.8
1.0
1.8
1.7
1.3
1.8
1.3
1.8
1.1

2.3
1.9
6.6
7.5
3.5
0.7
3.4

Bonus Paid
for Leases
(million dollars)·

141.0
108.5
89.7
282.7
489.4
12.8
95.9
33.7
209.2
510.1
1,346.4
111.7
945.1
96.3
2,251.3
3,082.5
5,022.9
1,088.1
2,243.0
1,568.6
1,767.0
5,078.9
4,204.6
6,653.0
3,987.4
5,749.0
4,037.1
1,539.4
187.1
497.2

45.0
53,429.8
TOTAL
538.0
rounded figures
Source: Offshore Information & Publications, Minerals Management Serv., U.S. Dep't of
the Interior, Federal Offshore Statistics: 1987, Leasing, Exploration, Production & Revenues
12 (OCS Report MMS 89-0058, compiled by W. Harris and L. Thurston) (1989).

•

Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Secretary Watt testified before Congress that the "funda
mental purpose of the OCS program is to inventory and ultimately develop the hydrocar
bon resources of the Outer Continental Shelf." Id. Even under Secretary Watt's increased
rate of leasing, it would still take 137 years to evaluate the energy potential of the federal
OCS. Id. at 370 (statement of Arthur Spaulding, Vice President and General Manager,
Western Oil & Gas Ass'n and the Alaska Oil & Gas Ass'n).
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B. Leasing in Frontier Areas
A major element of the Watt program was early leasing of fron
tier OCS areas that had a high potential for hydrocarbon discovery,
particularly frontier areas off the coast of Alaska. 55 In a statement by
Secretary Watt before a House Subcommittee, the Secretary explained
that "[t]here will be greater emphasis on early entry into areas of high
potential. Here we are talking about the frontier areas of offshore
Alaska."56
Through 1982, only 10% of the acreage leased had been in fron
tier OCS regions outside the producing areas of the Gulf of Mexico
and the Santa Barbara Channel. 57 Furthermore, as of 1980, only
0.6% of Alaska's vast OCS area had been offered for lease, and only
0.2 % had ever been leased. S8 The Watt program, therefore, .provided
for an overall 17% increase in lease sales over the Andrus Program,
with major increases occurring in Alaska. 59 Planned Alaska sales in
creased by 60% from ten to sixteen sales. Alaska sales constituted
38% of the total planned program sales, an increase from about 27%
observed· in the Andrus plan. 6O Scheduled lease sale dates were also
advanced in the higher potential areas. 61
C.

Streamlining the

oes Leasing Program

"OCS sale preparation is a complex, participative process."62
Under the traditional procedures,63 the first important prelease step
55. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, u.s. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.
EMD-82-26, PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S NEW ACCELERATED OFFSHORE LEASING PRO
GRAM REQUIRE ATTENTION 11 (1981) [hereinafter PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELER
ATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM]; The Great Arctic Energy Rush, Bus. WK., Jan. 24, 1983,
at 52-53 [hereinafter The Great Arctic Energy Rush].
56. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 51 (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior).
57. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET:
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF FIVE-YEAR LEASING PROGRAM 1 (1982).
58. ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS, supra note 36, at 7. See also oes Over
sight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 355-56 (statement of John McKeever, Staff Geolo
gist, Amoco Prod. Co., Alaska).
59. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 6.
60. Id. at 6-9.
61. Id. at 10-11.
62. Id. at 14.
63. For discussions comparing the traditional leasing procedures against the stream
lined leasing methods adopted by Secretary Watt, see 1 FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE
YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note 13, at 17-22; HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY
WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 7; Vass I, supra note 35, at 62

64.
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was the Call for Nominations issued by the Interior Department that
designated certain acreage for leasing consideration. 64 Industry,
coastal states, and other concerned groups then nominated individual
tracts to be included or deleted from the lease sale. 65 Information re
ceived in tract nominations was used to make a Tentative Tract Selec
tion of tracts to be considered in a proposed lease sale. 66 A Draft
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was then prepared on these
tracts.67 The DEIS discussed the likely effects of oil and gas leasing on
each OCS tract to be offered,68 and additional tracts were deleted if the
DEIS showed them to be especially sensitive to environmental
damage.69
After the DEIS had been circulated for public review and com
ment, a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was written on
the same tract-specific basis.70 The FEIS provided information to as
sist the Secretary in deciding whether or not to hold a sale, to delete
particular tracts, or to place restrictions on specific tracts.1 1 The
United States Geological Survey (USGS) then calculated the value of
the resources in each tract.72 The tracts remaining after this extensive
narrowing process were then available to be offered for lease. 73 If the
Secretary decided to hold the lease sale, a Notice of Sale was published
in the Federal Register referring to such matters as the details of the
tracts to be leased, measures to avoid adverse environmental impacts,
and special stipulations that may be imposed on leasing certain
tracts. 74 The lease sale itself would occur not less than thirty days
64. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 62, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1469; HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING
PLAN, supra note 4, at 7.

65. Id. See also PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM,
supra note 55, at 14.
66. Id.
67. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 62, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1469.
68. Id.
69. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 7.
70. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 63, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1470.
71. Id.
72. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 7; PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 14.
73. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 63, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1470.
74. Id.
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afterwards. 75 "On the average, these successive procedures took forty
two months to complete."76
Secretary Watt approved proposals to streamline the.presale plan
ning process. These changes in the OCS leasing system were designed
to reduce the planning time of sales, increase the amount of acreage
offered in each sale, permit early entry into OCS areas with high en
ergy potential, and utilize market forces rather than the federal gov
ernment to select areas for offshore leasing exploration. 77
Streamlining the presale planning process involved substantive
changes in the manner in which the Mineral Management Service
(MMS) prepared for OCS sales, and in the composition of the sales
themselves. It involved "a shift in focus from studying the offering of
a relatively small number of scattered tracts to studying the offering of
entire planning areas,"78 and relied on interest in the marketplace to
stimulate lease offerings. 79 Under the Watt program, potential sales
were studied in eight planning areas off the lower forty-eight states and
ten areas off Alaska. 80 These planning areas were based on geologic
considerations, and basins were generally grouped together. Each sale
involved one planning area. 8!
The streamlined leasing program initiated by Secretary Watt in
troduced three basic changes into the prelease planning process: pre
call activities, Call for Information, and Area Identification. 82 Precall
activities, which take place prior to the Call for Information, include
the preparation by the MMS of a geology report, an environmental
analysis, an exploration report, and modeling studies concerning so
75. Id. at 64, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1471.
76. Vass I, supra note 35, at 63 (footnote omitted).
77. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior); Interior Proposes Final Five-Year oes Sale Plan, Oil &
Gas J., May 24, 1982, at 44; Edwards, Reagan Administration Brings New Approach to
Federal oes Leasing, Oil & Gas J., May 4, 1981, at 203.
78. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 232-33 (statement of J. Robin
son West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior); 1
FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note 13, at 17.
79. oes Leasing Proposal Keyed to Market Forces, Oil & Gas J., Feb. 22, 1982, at 56
[hereinafter oes Leasing Proposal Keyed to Market Forces]; Reagan Energy Policy Plan
Tied to Free Market, Oil & Gas J., July 20, 1981, at 22 [hereinafter Reagan Energy Policy
Plan Tied to Free Market].
80. News Release (July 21, 1982), supra note 34, at 6-7.
81. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 233 (statement of J. Robinson
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
82. Industry Backs Area-Wide Sale ofoeS Blocks, Oil & Gas J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 54
[hereinafter Industry Backs A rea- Wide Sale of oes Blocks]; Interior Fine Tunes Plan for
Leasing on oes, Oil & Gas J., Jan. 4, 1982, at 73; Changes in oes Leasing Procedures
Brighten U.S. Outlook Offshore, Oil & Gas J., May 4, 1981, at 93; Edwards, supra note 77.
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cioeconomic effects, oil spills, and air quality. Under the Watt pro
gram, early submission of geology, exploration and development
reports, combined with the areawide offering concept under the
streamlined process accelerated the eventual preparation of the DEIS
by about twenty-two months. 83
The second major change was an increase in private industry in
volvement during the early stages of the leasing process. Whereas pre
viously Department of the Interior personnel made unilateral
determinations as to the areas to be leased, the new process utilizes a
Call for Information issued to the private sector inviting comments
from potential bidders regarding desirable leasing areas. 84 Secretary
Watt wanted "the market and not the Government [to] decide which
tracts are the most promising [for the discovery of oil and gas], and
which merit a priority in terms of scarce U.S. investment dollars."85
The rationale for areawide offerings was as follows:
[1] Significant domestic energy resources are believed to be
located on the DeS, but the precise quantities and locations are un
known because promising frontier areas have not been explored
thoroughly.
[2] Different geologists develop different interpretive views on
the probable location of oil and gas in anyone planning area.
[3] The best way to accelerate discovery of significant oil and
gas deposits is to encourage companies to pursue unique and diverse
exploration strategies based on these different views.
[4] In the [past] process the Federal Government makes judg
ments about which tracts are or are not likely to be bid· on. The
streamlined process will allow companies to concentrate their ef
forts on tracts they consider most promising, unless those tracts
have been deleted for other reasons through the pre-sale planning
process.
[5] The diverse exploration strategies which will be tested
under the streamlined process are necessary in order to fully test an
area. Only a small percentage of a planning area can be expected to
contain economically producible resources and it would probably
slow the geologic delineation of an area if small portions of it are
made available on a piecemeal basis. 86
83. 1 FINAL EIS SuPP. ON THE FIvE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note
13, at 22-29.
84. Id. at 19.
85. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 14-15
(statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). See also id. at 11.
86. 1 FINAL EIS SuPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note
13, at 23.
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The Interior Department believed that by broadening the range of
possibilities from which industry could select to drill, it would expe
dite the discovery of commercially viable deposits of oil and gas in the
OCS.87 The petroleum industry supported replacing the Call for
Nominations with a Call for Information. 88
The third major change in the prelease planning process was the
substitution of Area Identification for the tentative tract selection pro
cess previously used. Area Identification formally announces the area
on which the EIS analysis will be focused, and the area which will
eventually be considered for leasing. Unlike the tentative tract selec
tion process which focused its EIS analysis on specific individual
tracts, the Area Identification process prepares an EIS for the entire
planning area. 89
To accommodate the streamlined leasing process and the new
definition of sale area, the Interior Department adopted a different ap
proach to the preparation of environmental impact statements. Essen
tially it involved two new procedures. The first was "telescoping,"
which is the simultaneous, rather than successive, execution of certain
steps. An example of telescoping is issuing the proposed notice of sale
during the same month in which the Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) is issued. The original practice had been to issue the
proposed notice of sale two months after the FEIS.90 Another element
of telescoping includes determining the scope of issues addressed in
the EIS. This is called the scoping process and includes the MMS
meeting with. federal, state, and local governments, as well as other
interested parties in order to gather information and to identify the
significant issues related to the proposed action. Scoping identifies in
dividual concerns and assists in the formulation of possible alterna
tives to the proposed action. Under the streamlined procedures, most
87. Id. Secretary Watt maintained that the streamlined leasing process "will attract
many competitors who will invest millions and billions of dollars in drilling operations that
will prove successful in delivering oil and gas to American consumers." Senate Hearings on
the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 12 (statement of James G. Watt, Secre
tary of the Interior).
88. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3: Hearings on Provisions of the Proposed Five
Year Leasing Program and Its Impact on Offshore Operations and Examine the GAO Report
on the Five-Year Program Before the Subcomm. on the Panama Canal/Outer Continental
Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 129
(1982) [hereinafter OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3] (statement of J. Robinson West, As
sistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
89. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 233 (statement of J. Robinson
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
90. Id. at 232-33; 1 FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHED
ULE, supra note 13, at 17-18.
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of the scoping meetings occur earlier than in past leasing practice and
the early receipt of this data shortens the time required to prepare an
EIS.91
The second change in the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) process involves the tiering of NEPA documents.92 Tiering
an EIS eliminates repetitive discussions of the same issues and focuses
on the actual issues ripe for decision at each level of environmental
review. 93 The EIS prepares for the first offering in a planning area,
emphasizes analysis rather than description, and provides an assess
ment of expected cumulative effects of exploration and development
activity that might occur within the entire planning area if all the pe
troleum resources in the planning area are developed. The NEPA
document prepared for the second areawide offering updates the EIS
from the 'first offering. Additional information includes results of
ongoing environmental studies and monitoring projects; as well as
data from any exploration activities that may have taken place. 94 On
the average, these streamlined procedures are completed in about
twenty-one months regardless of the leasing area. 95
As noted, under an areawide leasing system, industry identifies its
areas of leasing interest in the Call for Information. The DOl may
still exclude tracts from the sale for environmental reasons or by
adopting the recommendations of coastal states. However, under the
areawide system, industry is permitted greater flexibility to choose
where its investments in exploration will be made. The method of re
source evaluation is also changed, and the evaluations on the suffi
ciency of industry bids are made after the sale rather than before. 96
91.

I FINAL EIS SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note

13, at 19, 22; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.25 (1988).

92. oes Oversight Hearings-Pan 2, supra note I, at 51 (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior); Edwards, supra note 77, at 208.
93. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.20, 1508.28 (1988).
Whenever a broad environmental impact statement has been prepared (such as a
program or policy statement) and a subsequent statement or environmental as
seSsment is then prepared on an action included within the entire program or
policy (such as a site specific action) the subsequent statement or environmental
assessment need only summarize the issues discussed in a broader statement and
incorporate discussions from the broader statement by reference and shall con
centrate on the issues specific to the subsequent action.
Id. § 1502.20..
94. oes Oversight Hearings-Pan 2, supra note 1, at 233 (statement of J. Robinson
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
95. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, aU!.
96. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON OV·ERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON
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Industry criticized the tract nomination system because the DOl
made its own determinations of resource potential and often refused to
include many of the tracts nominated by industry in the sale. Other
critics charged that the limited number of tracts in each sale slowed
the leasing of OCS lands and depressed OCS production. 97 Areawide
leasing was adopted to provide industry with greater flexibility in se
lecting the tracts which offer the best potential for commercial discov
eries of oil and gas. The objectives are to stimulate the inventorying
and production of OCS oil and gas resources by expanding the amount
and location of acreage leased and increasing the rate of investment in
exploration of OCS lands. 98
Industry strongly supports the concept of areawide leasing, claim
ing that its increased participation in the exploration and development
activity in the nation's OCS regions is a direct result of areawide leas
ing. 99 Areawide leasing provides for creative approaches to offshore
exploration. It allows companies to bid on areas that were ignored by
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, PUB. No. GAORCED-85-66, EARLY ASSESSMENT OF INTE
RIOR'S AREA-WIDE PROGRAM FOR LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS 1-2 (1985) [hereinafter
EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM]; HOUSE REP. ON SECRE
TARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 7. For discussions com
paring DOl's previous tract selection process to its areawide leasing procedures, see EARLY
ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra, at 43-46; I FINAL EIS
SUPP. ON THE FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING SCHEDULE, supra note 13, at 17-24; HOUSE REP.
ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 7.
97. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 2.
98. Id. at I; OCS Leasing Process-Part 1: Hearings on the Five- Year Draft Proposed

Program for Oil and Gas Leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf, and the State/Federal
Consultation Process Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 84,457 (1986)
[hereinafter Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1] (statement of Patricia E. Hughes,
Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Office).

99. Outer Continental Shelf Five-Year Program: Hearings on the Five-Year Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Proposed Program Before the Subcomm. on the Panama/
Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 334 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings on OCS Five-Year Program] (statement of
Dr. Theodore R. Eck, Chief Economist, Amoco Corp.); Hagar, Gulfof Mexico A rea- Wide
Sales Draw Kudosfrom Operators, Oil & Gas. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 39; Industry Backs Area
Wide Sale of OCS Blocks, supra note 82. For an industry view on areawide leasing, see
NATIONAL OCEAN INDUS. ASS'N, AREA WIDE LEASING: NATIONAL BOON OR INDUSTRY
BOONDOGGLE? AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE ON THE FIRST YEAR OF THE OCS AREA
WIDE LEASING PROGRAM IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, (1984), reprinted in Hearings on OeS
Five-Year Program, supra, at 197-212; Kelly, An Industry Perspective on Areawide Leasing
(remarks presented at the U.S. Dep't of the Interior OCS PoliCy Committee Meeting,
Washington, D.C., Jan. 12, 1984), reprinted in Outer Continental Shelf: Hearings on Outer

Continental Shelf Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 257-65 (1986) [hereinafter
Hearings on OCS].
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others or that were not available under the tract selection system.
Over the long term, industry maintains that areawide leasing will re
sult in the location and development of more oil and gas than the tract
selection system. lOO Areawide offerings also provide a more efficient
means of gathering and using exploration information. The areawide
system makes it possible for companies to follow promising geological
formations because large areas are available for exploration. The
larger the number of exploration opportunities, the greater the chance
for new discoveries and the more efficiently scarce capital will be used
for exploration. \01
The shift from tract nomination to areawide leasing, however,
was strongly opposed by environmental groups and coastal states.
These groups allege that areawide leasing is nothing more than a "fire
sale" and giveaway of the nation's resources, and because of the mag
nitude of the sales, is a threat to the coastal environment. \02 As a
result, the areawide leasing program was subject to unprecedented liti
gation on a significant number of sales. \03
II.

OPPOSITION TO THE WAIT FIVE-YEAR OCS PLAN

The Watt five-year plan for accelerated OCS oil and gas leasing
received .extensive criticism from coastal states (particularly Massa
chusetts, Alaska, and California), local governments, environmental
100. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 121 (statement of
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States,
Amoco Prod. Co., on Behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.); Hagar, supra note 99, at 40-42.
See also Areawide Leasing Increases Rig Utilization Rates, OFFSHORE, Jan. 1985, at 9; Area
wide Offerings are Best Solution, OFFSHORE, Mar. 1984, at 29; Gulf Sale Proves Merit of
Area Concept, OFFSHORE, July 1983, at 33; LeBlanc, Flexure Play Spurs Area-Wide Bid
ding, OFFSHORE, July 1983, at 35.
101. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 121 (statement of
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States,
Amoco Prod. Co., on Behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.).
102. Id. at 102 (statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.), and at 467 (statement of Jack Giberson, Chief Clerk, General Land
Office, State of Texas); Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Activities: Hearing on Outer Conti
nental Shelf Leasing Activities Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Supply of
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (I984) [here
inafter Hearing on OCS LeaSing Activities] (statement of Elizabeth Raisbeck, Legislative
Director, Friends of the Earth and the Coast Alliance); Crow, Critical Issues in OCS Activ
ity Could Be Resolved This Summer, Oil & Gas J., July 2, 1984, at 19-20.
103. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 407 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director,
Oceans, Coast and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.); Hearing on OCS Five-Year
Dev. Plan, supra note 4, at 178 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts,
and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.); EARLY AsSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE
LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, at 51.
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ists, and citizen groups.l04 These groups expressed five principal
concerns about Secretary Watt's accelerated OCS leasing program.
First, coastal states and local governments could not cope with such
an expansion. IDS Second, the Department of the Interior and the pe
troleum industry might not have the ability to manage and execute so
vast a program. 106 Third, proposals to reduce or eliminate federal
funding for ocean and coastal zone management programs, proposed
at the same time oil and gas leasing was accelerated, threatened to
seriously limit state and local governments' capacity to provide the
necessary infrastructure and cope with the impacts of the leasing pro
gram. 107 Fourth, environmental assessments would be less useful as
planning documents. lOS Finally, the accelerated leasing schedule
would not promote leasing at fair market value. 109
A.

The Ability of Coastal States and Local Governments to Cope
with Accelerated Leasing

The pace and magnitUde of leasing under the Watt program
threatened the ability of coastal states and local governments to cope
effectively with such an expansion. 110 State and local governments
maintained that they were unable to assess adequately the environ
mental impact of leasing and plan for that impact. They also claimed
that they were unable to comment effectively and participate in the
104. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 224-25 (statement of Repre
sentative Leon Panetta of California); Hearing on the Five- Year oes Leasing Schedule,
supra note 4, at 45 (statement of Representative Don Young of Alaska); Crow, supra note
102, at 19.
105. Crow, supra note 102, at 20.
106. PITFALLS. IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 38-64.
107. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 146.
108. Crow, supra note 102, at 20.
109. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 50.
110. The accelerated OCS lease schedule did "very little to accommodate the legiti
mate concerns of the State of Alaska." oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at
457 (letter from Jay Hammond, Governor of Alaska, to James G. Watt, Secretary of the
Interior). After reviewing the lease schedule, Governor Hammond commented: "Not sur
prisingly, the local communities of coastal Alaska are overwhelmed by the proposed accel
eration of OCS Leasing in their regions." Id. James Souby, Director of Policy
Development and Planning for Governor Hammond, testified before Congress that: "Six
teen oil and gas lease sales in 10 Alaskan planning areas totaling more than 550 million
acres in the next 5 years are simply too much too soon. Seven of the offshore sales would
be first time offerings in Alaskan frontier areas with formidable environmental conditions."
GAO Disputes oes Revenue Estimate, Oil & Gas J., June 28, 1982, at 42. See also oes
Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 423-56.
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preleasing process. 111
Coastal states sought an increased role in the federal OCS deci
sionmaking which would vitally affect their interests. Coastal state
and local government concerns over the Watt OCS plan produced dis
cussions of a "Seaweed Rebellion"112 comparable to the inland "Sage
brush Rebellion."113 At a meeting of western governors held in
Ill. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 403-04 (statement of Mr. Al Aramburu,
County Supervisor, Marin County, California); Crow, supra note 102, at 20.
112. Seaweed Rebellion: States Seek Greater Say in Off-Shore Drilling, Salt Lake
Tribune, Sept. II, 1981, at 2A, col. 3 [hereinafter Seaweed Rebellion: States Seek Greater
Say in Off-Shore Drilling].
113. In recent years, the western states have challenged federal ownership of public
lands within their boundaries through the introduction of "Sagebrush Rebellion Acts" in
state legislatures. These legislative proposals would shift the ownership of public lands
from the federal government to the states. Such legislation was considered in the following
states: Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Sim
ilar legislation has also been filed in the United States Senate. Backman, Public Land Law
Reform-Reflectionsfrom Western Water Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1,5-6.
Western states recognize that the federal government's most direct impact on their
future arises from its position as the owner and steward of about 733 million acres of pub
licly-owned land, one-third of the land area of the United States. The majority of federal
land ownership is in 12 western states. The percent of land owned by the federal govern
ment within these states is as follows: Alaska, 86%; Arizona, 44%; California, 48%; Colo
rado, 36%; Idaho, 64%; Montana, 30%; Nevada, 85%; New Mexico, 34%; Oregon, 49%;
Utah, 61%; Washington, 31%, and Wyoming, 50%. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 19865 (1987).
Within these federal lands are significant amounts of natural resources. Federallands
contain 85% of the nation's oil, 72% of oil shale, 37% of the natural gas, 37% of the
uranium ore, and 50% of geothermal resources. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LI
BRARY OF CONG., 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE ENERGY FACTBOOK 58 (1980); Reagan
Energy Policy Plan Tied to Free Market, supra note 79, at 22. While federal lands contain
significant amounts of fossil fuels, production of these resources has been modest. The
percentages of fossil fuel production on federally administered lands as a percent of total
United States production for the year 1986 were as follows: crude oil, 19.2%; natural gas,
30.4%; and coal, 22.8%. OFFICE OF ENERGY MARKETS AND END USE, ENERGY INFOR
MATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 1988 17 (1989)
[hereinafter 1988 ANNUAL ENERGY REV.].
The United States is not the only country facing challenges to federal control over
energy resources. Canada also faces the issue of whether control of domestic oil and gas
development should be centered at the local or national level. For a discussion of the
Canadian "snowshoe" rebellion, see Nagy, Sagebrush and Snowshoes: The Struggle for
Natural Resource Control in the United States and Canada, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
247 (1981). For discussions on the Sagebrush Rebellion, see Nevada v. United States, 699
F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983); Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental
Perspective on the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847 (1982); Brodie, A Question of
Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding Federal Ownership of the Public
Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693 (1981); Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management I:
The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535 (1982); Getches, Manag
ing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RE
SOURCES J. 279 (1982); Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law. Politics and
Federal Lands. 14 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980); Mollison & Eddy. Jr., The Sagebrush
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September 1981, Governor Jay Hammond of Alaska commented that
the federal policy of offshore leasing appeared to be "a reduction of
states' rights under the so-called 'New Federalism'" which demon
strated "undue and unnecessary insensitivity" to coastal states. 114
Governor Hammond claimed that "unless [the OCS leasing schedule
was] amended [it] could do severe violence to those of us who live in
[those] coastal areas."IlS In a letter to the Interior Department, he
asserted that "the State of Alaska is firmly opposed to both the magni
tude and pace of leasing proposed for the Alaska OCS region. . .." 116
Governor Hammond further stated that "Alaskans are being asked to
shoulder an inequitable portion of the risks and impacts inherent in oil
and gas activities conducted in hazardous offshore waters."1l7
Critics raised a number of specific objections to accelerated leas
ing in offshore Alaska. The state has little of the social and govern
mental infrastructure found in other areas of the United States that are
subject to OCS development I 18 and did not have sufficient time under
the accelerated OCS lease schedule to plan and provide for needed
facilities and social services. The leasing program proposed by Inte
rior Secretary Andrus provided an average planning time of twenty-six
months for sales in the Gulf of Mexico and up to forty-one months for
sales in Alaska. 1l9 These time frames reflected not only the different
environmental characteristics of the two offshore regions, but also
their differing degrees of infrastructure development. Under the Watt
leasing program, however, sale planning steps were completed in
about twenty-one months in both regions. 12o
The state of California also opposed the accelerated OCS leasing
Rebellion: A Simplistic Response to the Complex Problems 0/ Federal Land Management,
19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97 (1982); Titus, The Nevada Sagebrush Rebellion Act: A Question
o/Constitutionality, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 263 (1981); Wald & Temkin, The Sagebrush Rebel
lion: The West Against Itself-Again, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 187 (1982); Note,
The Property Power. Federalism. and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817
(1980); Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980
UTAH L. REV. 505.
114. Seaweed Rebellion: States Seek Greater Say in Off-Shore Drilling, supra note
112, at 2A, col. 3.
115. Id.
116. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 457 (letter from Jay Ham
mond, Governor of Alaska, to James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 275 (statement of Barbara Heller, Consultant, Envtl. Policy Center).
119. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 11, 13. The leasing program under Secretary Andrus provided for 30 months to plan
for a sale in the Pacific OCS region and 31 months for planning Atlantic OCS region sales.
Id. at 13.
120. Id. at 11, 13.
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program, particularly lease sale number fifty-three in the Santa Maria
Basin. 121 The proposed drilling there would occur near four of north
ern California's most beautiful beaches, but would only produce a ten
day national supply of petroleum. 122 As a result, congressional and
other political sources also opposed the direction of the OCS leasing
program in California. 123 On March 19, 1981, twenty-nine members
of the California congressional delegation wrote to President Reagan
121. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom Secretary of the Interior v. California,
464 U.S. 312 (1984).
122. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 373. The United States Geological
Survey estimated that Sale No. 53 had a potential of 983 million barrels of petroleum.
0pf/Jnents of the sale maintained that this amount did not justify the environmental risks
of offshore drilling. Id. Industry, however, displayed unusual interest in the petroleum
potential of the Santa Maria Basin. The sale drew $2.278 billion in high bids. Among the
offers was one that established a record at that time for the biggest bonus for a single tract
as well as the' highest per-acre bonus. Rintoui, California's Staggering Sale, OFFSHORE,
July 1981, at 57.
Phillips Petroleum Company and Chevron U.S.A., a subsidiary of Standard Oil Com
pany of California, paid a record for that date of $333.6 million for the right to drill for oil
on a single 57oo-acre offshore tract in the Santa Maria Basin off Point Arguello, California.
Test drilling in the Santa Maria Basin confirmed the existence of a major oilfield, and
experts now predict that the Santa Maria Basin could be the largest single American oil
discovery since Alaska's Prudhoe Bay in 1968. Originally the field's potential reserves were
estimated at 100 million barrels of oil. Since the test drilling, however, projections have
risen to put the ultimate potential between 300 million and one billion barrels of oil. A
Billion-Barrel Find?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1982, at 84; Black-Gold Rush, TIME, Nov. 29,
1982, at 63.
123. The controversy generated over including the Santa Maria Basin'in OCS lease
offerings is illustrated by the remarks of California Congressman John Burton, who re
ferred to Mr. Watt in congressional hearings as "the Secretary of the Inferior." OCS Over
sight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 9. Congressman Burton further stated:
So it is obvious that lock, stock and barrel [Secretary Watt] is in the pocket
of the oil industry, he is going to destroy the fishing industry in our area, he is
going to destroy the ecology of our area, and he is going to do it all in the name
of-I do not know what, but I am sure he can think of something.
I think it is outrageous exploitation ....
Id. at 10.
California Congressman Paul McCloskey, however, questioned the environmentalist's
perspective on opposing the lease sale:
[T]he protection of one of the most beautiful coastlines in the world is impor
tant, but just as serious is the national need to avoid the necessity of going to war
in the Persian Gulf. . .
... I want to confess that in comparing these two perspectives the desire to
prevent going to war in the Middle East and to prevent spending an additional
$38 million in increased defense expenditures, outweighs the possibility of having
to say as a Representative from California, yes, we are willing to go to war to
protect our source of oil, but we are not willing to drill off our own coast because
of a desire to protect our own environment. The standard environmentalist's per
spective on the lease-sale seems a little hollow unless we have clear evidence that
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asking him to overturn Secretary Watt's action and exclude four
northern California basins-Eel River, Point Arena, Bodega, and
Santa Cruz-from OCS leasing.124 Senator Alan Cranston, a Califor
nia Democrat, called for Watt's resignation, and the Republican Party
Chairman of California, Mr. Tirso del Junco, warned Secretary Watt
in a June 1, 1981 letter that a decision to open up certain offshore
reserves along the coast of California for oil and gas drilling could
"severely hamper" the election of Republican candidates 10
California. 125
Opponents of Secretary Watt's plan to lease California's OCS
were concerned about the environmental impacts of nearshore devel
opment. 126 The majority of California's OCS, particularly in southern
California, drops rapidly from the coast reaching a depth of 350 me
ters at an offshore distance of approximately twelve miles. Any fed
eral OCS devel9pment must occur very close to shore because present
the danger of drilling represents a real danger of environmental damage to the
coast.
Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 5-6 (statement of Representative Paul Mc
Closky of California).
Wallace Stokes, a private citzen, also challenged the environmentalists' view of OCS
development of the California coast. He stated before a House subcommittee on OCS
oversight:
Individuals and representatives of organizations have appeared before you today
representing almost every creature of the deep in California's vast off-shore inven
tory of sea life, but who has spoken for man? We speak of protecting man's
environment and yet ignore the fact that man is a social being. An economics
guided and energy-consuming creature that is a very important component of the
world's total environment.
Today I appear before you as a private citizen attempting to speak for man,
particularly the sector of our citizenry who are the urban poor.
On behalf of the urban poor, Mr. Stokes stated:
It is all well and good for those coastline residents to express concerns for preser
vation of the unique beauty and environment, but it is of little value and abso
lutely no help to that automobile worker in Milpitas thrown out of a job because
of rising energy costs. We can talk about environmental protection for the whale,
but it doesn't address the very real human need of the San Francisco Tenderloin
resident and her inability to maintain an adequate diet because of escalating en
ergy costs.
Assuming for the moment that the USGS estimates are correct, the oil in lease
hold 53 is projected to make 10,000 jobs. Can we neglect this impact on [the]
unemployed in this Nation?
Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 434-35 (statement of Mr. Wallace Stokes).
124. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 8-9 (statement of Represen
tative John Burton of California).
125. 12 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 247 (June 19, 1981).
126. Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 58-61 (statement of Sena
tor Pete Wilson of California).
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technology limits drilling to areas less than 350 meters in depth.127
California coastal communities voiced three concerns about near
shore OCS development. First, the risk of an oil spill could have a
devastating effect on the economies of coastal communities that in
large part depended on the fishing, recreation, and tourist indus
tries. 128 A second concern with nearshore development was increased
air pollution. 129 Since the prevailing winds off southern California are
onshore, nearshore development would increase air pollution. 130
Coastal communities, already violating the Clean Air Act, objected to
nearshore OCS drilling because the increase in pollution levels would
result in stricter air quality control standards and growth restric
tions. 131 The final concern with nearshore OCS development was vis
ual pollution. 132 Oil platforms located twelve to fifteen miles off the
coast were offensive to residents of coastal communities and would
reduce property values and hinder the tourism business. 133
Opponents of the Watt leasing plan also maintained that as the
third largest oil producing state in the nation, California already con
tributed its share to national energy needs. 134 The amount of oil to be
127. Id. at 58.
128. Id. at 58-59.
129. Id. at 60.
130. Id.
131. "According to the California Air Resources Board, the emissions associated
with one exploratory drilling operation are equivalent to 5,000 1982 passenger cars travel
ing 50 miles per day for one year." Id.
132. Id. at 61.
133. Id.; Energy and National Security-5, u.s. Must Balance Its Environmental.
Energy Concerns, Oil & Gas J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 27. The objections of California coastal
communities to the visual pollution of oil rigs illustrates the regional differences to domes
tic oil development. The Gulf States, particularly Louisiana and Texas which have exper
ienced the majority of OCS drilling assert that Californians "perceive ... oes energy
development to be the same ... as waste disposal, a necessary obligation but preferably
done in someone else's backyard." Hearing on OCS Five-Year Dev. Plan, supra note 4, at 2.
See also Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 29, Miscues Add New Twists
to Saga a/Oil. Gas Work o./fCalijornia, Oil & Gas J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 15. The Gulf States
complain that Californians want to live their lives without producing for the rest of the
country any of the products that they enjoy consuming and that is not fair. Hearing on
OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 29; Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 102;
Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part ], supra note 98, at 25.
The California approach to visual pollution-because you do not like the way a drill
ing rig looks, you do not drill-is not a rational solution to the problem. The nation needs
to determine whether there are recoverable reserves in the federal OCS and an accurate
inventory can only be made by drilling. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 95.
134. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 46-47, 56, (statement of
Senator Pete Wilson of California); Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 103. Opponents of
leasing California's OCS claim that the relatively small amounts of oil to be discovered do
not justify the risks of development. California's OCS will most likely not provide enough
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recovered in the OCS areas of California might be significant to a sin
gle leasing company, but leasing opponents claimed that there did not
appear to be enough oil to justify taking the risks of development. 135
In this case, the state of California, environmentalists, and citizen
groups claimed that the nation's energy needs did not outweigh the
potential disaster to local interests that OCS development could
bring. 136
In response to California's argument that the environmental risks
of offshore drilling were "too great for the amount of petroleum to be
found in California's OCS, Secretary Watt replied that the risks were
extremely limited and "directly associated with the" quantity of oil
found. Small or no dis~overies of oil result in virtually no risk. A
theoretically higher risk would occur only if larger quantities of oil are
found. And if that is the case, the value of production to the Nation
substantially increases." 137
Secretary Watt maintained that a far bigger danger to the coastal
environment than the development of OCS energy resources was the
risk of oil spills from giant tankers carrying foreign oil to the United
States. 138 The Secretary also pointed out that California "conducted
petroleum to satisfy the nation's oil needs through the end of the century, the end of the
decade, or even through one year, nor will it free the country from dependence on foreign
oil. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 55 (statement of Senator Pete
Wilson of California).
135. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 47, 54 (statement of Sena
tor Pete Wilson of California).
136. Id.; Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1986
Part 5: Hearings of the Testimony of Public Witnesses, Energy and Related. Programs,
Before the Subcomm on the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-32 (1985) [hereinafter House Hearings
on the 1986 Dep't of the Interior Appropriations-Part 5] (statement of Tom Bradley,
Mayor, City of Los Angeles, California); Crow, supra note 102, at 20.
137. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 516-17 (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Secretary Watt summarized the debate over leasing OCS
lands off the coast of California in the following manner:
Those opposing sale 53 have tried to cast the issue as one of either oil and
gas, or other important values. Experience in the Gulf of Mexico in Federal and
State waters, and off southern California in Federal and State waters, shows that
it is not an either/or question. Offshore oil and gas is compatible with other uses
and values of the ocean.
Id. at 516-17.
138. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 25, 1981, at 49; OCS Oversight Hearings
Part 2, supra note I, at 50 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Oil
imports by massive tankers into the United States are more of a threat to our coastal envi
ronment than spillage from OCS production. The oes program is the nation's safest en
ergy extraction program. Of the 60 largest oil spills recorded in American waters, 59 were
caused by tanker spills; only one was the result of OCS oil and gas activity. During the last
decade, OCS-related oil spills totaled 84,000 barrels. In contrast, just one recent tanker
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numerous lease sales within state waters at the same time it opposed
federal OCS lease sales.139 He further noted that California is the larg
spill involving the British tanker ALVENUS spilled 30,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf of
Mexico. OTA Report: Hearing on a Report by the Office of Technology Assessment: "Oil
and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater" Before the Subcomm. on Panama Ca
nal/Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Hearing on OTA Rep.] (statement of Representative
Jack Fields of Texas); Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 4-5
(statement of Representative Jack Fields of Texas). This one tanker incident dumped more
oil into United States waters than the total oil discharged by all OCS activities during the
eight year period from 1976 through 1983. During this period, oil spills from tankers
caused 21 times as much pollution as all energy development activities on the OCS. Hear
ings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 86.
The success of the OCS safety record is ilIustrated.by the fact that in the last decade an
average of five barrels of oil were spilled for every one million barrels produced on the OCS.
Hearing on OTA Rep., supra, at 29 (statement of Representative Jack Fields of Texas). In
1985, only 1600 barrels of oil were spilled nationwide as a result of OCS energy activity.
Oil production in that year was almost 400 million barrels. Hearing on OCS Five- Year Dev.
Plan, supra note 4, at 125-26 (statement of Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior).
The threat of oil spills is the single major fear from leasing California's OCS. How
ever, the total oil spilled in California's offshore waters from OCS operations from 1970
through 1987 is only 210 barrels. That compares with discharges into California's OCS
waters of about one million barrels of oil and grease from the Los Angeles treatment plant,
five million barrels from San Luis Obispo to San Diego, and two million barrels from natu
ral seeps during that period. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropria
tions for 1988--Part 9: Hearings on the Department of the Interior Budget for Fiscal Year
1988 Before the Subcomm. on the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 685-86 (1987).
In an extensive study on the effects of offshore oil and natural gas development on the
coastal zone, the Congressional Research Service concluded that "offshore OCS production
will be less damaging to the environment than importing a like amount of petroleum."
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CoNG., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., A STUDY
ON THE EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON THE
COASTAL ZoNE 1 (1976) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS
DEV. ON THE COASTAL ZONE]. The Congressional Research Service stated:
Most oil pollution in the oceans comes from vessels, especially tankers, and
from waste oil in municipal and industrial effluents. A five-percent reduction in
oil pollution from either of these sources would have a more positive impact on
the marine environment than elimination of all offshore production. Transporta
tion (tankers primarily) contributes an estimated 35 percent of all ocean oil pollu
tion. River and urban runoff contributes 31 percent, and offshore production 1.3
percent.
Id. at l.
139. Final Five-Year Plan for Oil and Gas Development in the Outer Continental
Shelf: Hearings to Review the Secretary ofthe Interior's Proposed Five- Year Plan for Oil and
Gas Development in the Outer Continental Shelf Pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act Amendments of 1978 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Supply
of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS LeaSing Plan] (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). See also House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't of the Interior
Appropriations-Part 5, supra note 136, at 30-32 (statement of Tom Bradley, Mayor, City
of Los Angeles, California), and at 188-92 (statement of Robert Moeller, President, Yolo
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est gasoline consuming state in the nation, and therefore has a respon
sibility to meet its own consumer petroleum needs as well as
contribute to the energy supply of the country.l40 The controversy
over leasing California's OCS, therefore, was "the classic example of
the broad public interests versus local interests and, as is often the
case, local concerns do not always reflect national or even regional
needs."141
Interior officials maintained that if the United States were "to op
erate on a principle that every time you drill a well it has to carry the
potential of carrying the entire Nation for months on end, there would
be no drilling ... at all."142 The nation's supply of petroleum comes
from thousands of leases across the country, each contributing its own
share of petroleum production. Exempting offshore tracts from OCS
development has reduced employment opportunities 143 and resulted in
County Farm Bureau) (California is the largest agricultural state in the nation, and its
agricultural production is dependent upon abundant energy supplies); Each Stalled OCS
Sale a Missed Chance/or a More Secure u.s. Energy Future, Oil & Gas J., Jan. 10, 1983, at
21 [hereinafter Each Stalled OCS Sale a Missed Chance for a More Secure U.S. Energy
Future].
Secretary Watt stated in congressional testimony that:
While criticizing us, California has been properly issuing hundreds of drilling
permits within State waters. In fact, since 1979, Governor Brown has been issu·
ing offshore oil drilling permits in the Santa Barbara Channel. It must be
remembered that the California leases are within three miles of the coastline and
the beaches. The State's activities are what you see; the Federal activities affect
the lands far out under the ocean waters.
Senate Hearings on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 21 (statement of
James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior).
140. ·OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 56 (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). See also Hearing on OCS Five- Year Dev. Plan, supra note
4, at 69. California is the third largest user of gasoline in the world, exceeded only by the
United States and the Soviet Union. Hearing on OCS Five- Year Dev. Plan, supra note 4, at
69, 168. This oil dependence is largely due to a lifestyle built on the automobile. Californi
ans consume more fuel per person than any other state in the nation. Hearings on OCS,
supra note 99, at 102-03. In fact, the California Energy Commission predicts that by 1991,
the state's transportation sector alone will consume more oil than the entire nation pro
duces. Hearing on OCS Five-Year Dev. Plan, supra note 4, at 168 (statement of Representa
tive Daniel Lungren of California).
141. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 51 (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior). Secretary Watt's argument that special interest groups are
primarily responsible for the opposition to leasing California's OCS is supported by a 1983
state-wide survey of voters in which 56% of the population polled favored new OCS devel
opment off the coast of California. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 450.
142. Offshore Leasing Hearings, supra note 53, at 373.
143. House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't o/the Interior Appropriations-Part 5, supra
note 136, at 196 (statement of Marilyn Quinn, Youth for Energy Independence), at 221-22
(statement of Larry Luera, California Chapter of the League of United Latin Am. Citi
zens), and at 231-32 (statement of Donald C. Cobb, Vice President, Black Business Ass'n of
Los Angeles).
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the steady decline of oil production from OCS lands. l44 Annual OCS
oil production declined from 418 million barrels of oil in 1971 to 277
million barrels in 1980, a 33 % decrease. 145 Secretary Watt, therefore,
claimed that the national interest involved in developing offshore oil
and gas reserves went beyond state objections to offshore drilling
under the Department of the Interior's OCS program. 146
B.

Department of the Interior's Ability to Manage the Accelerated
OCS Program, and Industry's Capacity to Explore One
Billion Offshore Acres

A second concern with Secretary Watt's five-year leasing plan
was the Department of the Interior's ability to manage the accelerated
OCS program and the petroleum industry's capacity to explore one
billion offshore acres.
1.

The DOl's ability to manage the accelerated OCS program

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978
(OCSLAA) requires the Department of the Interior to estimate for
Congress the money and full-time permanent positions needed to sup
port a revised or new leasing schedule. 147 The Interior Department
estimated that it could administer the accelerated leasing program
with forty-two million dollars less than was estimated in the June 1980
lease schedule prepared by Secretary Andrus (a 5.6% reduction) and
with 948 fewer full-time positions (an 11 % reduction). While reduc
ing its budget and staff, the Interior Department offered more offshore
acreage through accelerated OCS lease sales than it had in the past,
144. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 234 (statement of J. Robinson
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
145. Id. at 234, 239.
146. Id. at 56 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior); Offshore Leas
ing Hearings, supra note 53, at 517 (statement of James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior).
Secretary Watt explained:
The overriding national interest dictates that the DCS exploration program
be carried on. We must know the resources at hand. This is recognized by con
gressional action and by statute. The criticism raised to date simply does not
balance the very small risks as compared to potential value of the likely produc
tion. Sale 53 is a step in implementing the intent of Congress to meet the overrid
ing national need to increase domestic oil and gas production. There can be no
increase in production until we know if it is there.
Id. at 517. See also OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 64 (statement of
. James G. Watt, Secretary of the Interior); House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't of the Interior
Appropriations-Part 5, supra note 136, at 230 (statement of Donald C. Cobb, Vice Presi
dent, Black Business Ass'n of Los Angeles); Each Stalled OCS Sale a Missed Chance for a
More Secure u.s. Energy Future, supra note 139, at 21.
147. 43 U.S.c. § 1344(b) (1982).
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primarily in frontier areas. The Interior Department did not explain
how the simultaneous reductions in program funding and staffing and
implementation of the accelerated leasing schedule would be
accomplished. 148
The U.S. Comptroller General questioned the adequacy of DOl's
funding and staffing estimates. In the opinion of the Comptroller Gen
eral, given the accelerated leasing program, funding and staffing needs
for the OCS program would exceed current projections if the program
goals were to be achieved. 149
2.

The petroleum industry's capacity to increase exploration for
offshore energy resources

Citizen groups also questioned the extent of the petroleum indus
try's capacity to explore and develop the vast quantities of new OCS
acreage offered under the accelerated program. 150 The history of OCS
development shows that the petroleum industry has been, and proba
bly will continue to be, slow in developing the offshore lands it
leases. 151 A 1981 report by the Energy Action Foundation, surveying
the worldwide lease holdings and production rates of twenty major oil
companies, found that the companies increased their holdings of unde
veloped oil and gas lands by over 43% from 1976 to 1980, but in
creased their acreage in production by only 2.5%. In 1976, the twenty
major oil companies had twenty-four acres in production for every 100
acres held inactive. In 1980, the number of acres in production had
declined to seventeen for every 100 acres leased but not producing. 152
As of 1981, the oil industry had leased only 3% of the Alaska, Califor
nia, and Atlantic OCS land initially considered for lease, and many
tracts that the industry did not explore and develop were returned to
the federal government. 153
148. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 38, 40.
149. Id. at 43.
150. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 224 (statement of Representa
tive Leon Panetta of California).
151. Fair Warning, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 17.
152. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 62.
153. R. TINNEY, OFFSHORE PETROLEUM EXPLORATION: CAPABILITIES AND CON
STRAINTS 5 (1981) (prepared for the Center for Envtl. Educ.), reprinted in Hearings on
OCS Lease Sales-Part 1, supra note 12, at 513-71. The Comptroller General, however,
concluded that the petroleum industry has been diligent in exploring and developing leased
lands. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. EMD-81
48, REPORT.TO THE CONGRESS: IMPACT OF REGULATIONS-AFTER FEDERAL LEAS
ING-ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 41-47 (1981). See
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Few studies analyzed the petroleum industry's capacity to handle
the accelerated leasing program. Furthermore, the Department of the
Interior saw no need for such studies. Secretary Watt maintained that
the availability of OCS lease offerings should not be determined by the
industry's capabilities. 154 Nevertheless, a report for the Center for En
vironmental Education (CEE) concluded that accelerated OCS devel
opment will be constrained by a shortage of available mobile offshore
drilling rigs, a lack of qualified personnel, the limits of oil and gas
technology, and a shortage of capital. 155 According to the CEE re
port, the offshore oil and gas industry did not have the capacity to
explore and develop the OCS lands offered under the accelerated leas
ing program. 156
The General Accounting Office (GAO), however, criticized the
CEE findings. The GAO concluded that the petroleum industry was
fully capable of increasing its offshore activities, although the exact
level of the increased activity was uncertain. It maintained that the
level of increased participation depended upon the economics of oil
development and the predictability of the leasing schedule rather than
also Government Charges of Operator Footdragging on Federal Leases Exposed as False Is
sue, Oil & Gas J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 107; GAO: Industry Diligent on Federal Leases, Oil &
Gas J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 129.
There are 117,000 oil and gas leases on federal onshore lands totaling 100 million acres
but only six million acres are in production. Furthermore, between 75% and 80% of fed
eral onshore leases expire without the submittal of drilling proposals. OCS Oversight Hear
ings-Pan 1, supra note 36, at 7 (statement of Representative John Burton of California).
Congressional opponents of the Watt OCS program questioned the rationale of accelerated
leasing when oil companies were not fully developing leases. It was pointed out that "there
[were] nearly 700 leases held by oil companies on Federal OCS lands totaling 3.5 million
acres with no drilling being conducted in those areas." Id. The OCSLA Amendments
prohibit the issuance of a lease if the bidder is not meeting due diligence requirements on
other OCS leases. The Act states: "No bid for a lease may be submitted if the Secretary
finds, after notice and hearing, that the bidder is not meeting due diligence requirements on
other leases." 43 U.S.c. § 1337(d) (1982). For a discussion on the diligence of industry
exploration of federal onshore oil and gas leases, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUB. No. GAO/EMD-82-82, ARE LEASEHOLDERS ADEQUATELY EXPLORING FOR OIL
AND GAS ON FEDERAL LANDS? (1982).
154. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 55.
155. R. TINNEY, supra note 153, at 5.
156. Id. at 46. The Watt accelerated program was not the first time that industry'S
capacity to explore expanded OCS leasing was questioned. Studies by the Federal Energy
Administration and the National Petroleum Council concluded that industry lacked the
capacity to respond to the Interior Department's proposal to lease 10 million OCS acres in
1975. NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., AN ANALYSIS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR'S PROPOSED ACCELERATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF OIL
AND GAS ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 6 (1975) [hereinafter NAT'L OCEAN
POL'y STUD.].
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on the magnitude of OCS lease offerings. ls7 The offshore petroleum
industry also claimed that it had the capacity to increase its activities
to meet the accelerated leasing schedule. ISS .
C.

Funding for Ocean and Coastal Programs

In fiscal year 1982, at the same time the Interior Department was
vastly accelerating OCS oil and gas leasing,IS9 the Reagan administra
tion proposed the elimination of federal funding for state implementa
tion of the Coastal Zone Management (CZM) program,16O the Coastal
Energy Impact (CEI) program, and the National Sea Grant (NSG)
program. 161 This funding provides grants and loans to mitigate the
adverse impact of coastal energy development. 162
The Reagan administration attempted to justify the proposed
budget cuts on several grounds. First, the administration argued that
federal CZM assistance had largely fulfilled its intended purpose-to
help states develop and implement CZM programs-with twenty-five
approved state programs covering 78% of the coastline. Thus, states
should now be expected to fully fund the program that manages their
coastal zones. Second, since many of the state CZM programs had
been in existence for several years and were an integral part of the
states' overall environmental protection activities, they were unlikely
to be abandoned because of the withdrawal of federal funding. 163
Third, economic growth resulting from energy resource development
on federal lands--either onshore or offshore-should create new tax
bases which would, in the long run, compensate for associated im
pacts. Fourth, the federal government still provided funding for com
munity facilities and services through a wide variety of categorical and
block grant programs-for instance, community development and
sewage treatment plant construction grants from the Environmental
Protection Agency. States and their political subdivisions had the op
157. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 50. See also id. at 50-64.
158. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3, supra note 88, at 33 (statement of E. A. Ward
well, Chairman, Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n); id. at 39 (statement of Paul Kelly, Corporate
Vice President, Zapata Corp., on behalf of the Infl Ass'n of Drilling Contractors); OCS
Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 363-69 (statement of Charles Matthews, Presi
dent, Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n).
159. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 36 (statement of Sarah
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
160. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988).
161. See 33 U.S.c. §§ 1121-1131 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
162. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 146; Chasis, The Coastal Zone
Management Act: A Protective Mandate, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 25 (1985).
163. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 36.
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portunity to target these sources of assistance to areas experiencing the
impact of energy development. Fifth, many port facilities were cur
rently underutilized due to declines in various coastal industrial activi
ties. The existence of this underutilized capacity made it unlikely that
the type of boomtown activity motivating the CEI program would re
sult.i 64 Finally, the administration considered further funding inap
propriate when balanced against the need to reduce the federal budget
deficit and taxes. 165
The proposed budget cuts would have effectively terminated the
only national programs for comprehensive coastal management and
protection. Withdrawal of federal funds would have caused the termi
nation or limitation of state coastal programs166 and would have sig
nificantly impaired the ability of state and local governments to plan
for and ameliorate the adverse impacts of OCS oil and gas
deve1opment. 167

In a survey of its member states, the Coastal States Organization
concluded that the termination of federal funding would destroy or
seriously impair 80% of existing state CZM programs. 168 "The result
will be that the existing statutory review responsibilities and proce
dures for OCS and other coastal-related development activities would
be seriously diminished, affecting the rate at which permits could be
issued."169 This would in tum affect the rate at which energy develop
ment projects could proceed.
Opponents of budget cuts for the nation's ocean and coastal pro
grams identified seven reasons why the Reagan administration should
support continued funding for national coastal programs. First, the
coast is a national resource. Coastal facilities and marine environ
164. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 29 (statement of W. Kenneth
Davis, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Energy).
165. Id. The elimination of the Coastal Zone Management Program would have
saved the federal government approximately $179 million through 1986. The termination
of the Coastal Energy Impact Program would have saved $158 million from the federal
budget through 1986. Oceanography Miscellaneous-Part 1: Hearings on Coastal Zone
Management Budget Cuts Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 445-46 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings
on CZM Budget Cuts] (statement of James Walsh, Acting Administrator, Nat'l Oceanic
and Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce).
166. S. REP. No. 112, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 112].
167. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 36 (statement of Sarah
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
168. Hearings on CZM Budget Cuts, supra note 165, at 522 (statement of Sarah
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
169. S. REP. No. 112, supra note 166, at 10.
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ments serve people throughout the nation, not just local residents. 17o
Moreover, the coastal zone contains some of the most biologically pro
ductive areas in the country.17I Second, the CZM program was the
only national program that dealt comprehensively with. the manage
ment of coastal resources. l72 Third, the CZM program established a
management framework that could deal with contemporary coastal
development problems. 173 Fourth, if CZM programs were discontin
ued, it would cost millions of dollars to reestablish them in the fu
ture. 174 Coastal states would have lost staff members who had
developed an expertise in coastal issues. 175 Fifth, with the acceleration
of OCS leasing, a resource management program was even more essen
tial for the protection of the marine environment. Sixth, it was unrea
sonable for the federal government to accelerate OCS leasing, yet fail
to provide coastal states with funds to deal with the impacts of acceler
ated leasing. The burden of supporting accelerated OCS development
should not be placed upon coastal states that had limited opportunities
to recover associated impact costs. Finally, CZM programs were cost
effective. The yearly budget for the CZM program was only thirty
seven million dollars. This was a small price to pay for a comprehen
sive national program of coastal resource management. 176
According to the coastal states, the elimination of the CZM and
CEI programs would severely limit their opportunity for meaningful
participation in the OCS decisionmaking process. Coastal states
barred from such participation might tum increasingly to litigation to
challenge individual lease sales. The Department of the Interior's at
tempt to accelerate OCS development might suffer major delays from
170. Hearings on CZM Budget Cuts, supra note 165, at 483 (statement of Dr. Marc
Hershman, President, Coastal Soc'y). See also id. at 513 (statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior
Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
171. Id. at 513 (statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.).
172. Id. at 483 (statement of Dr. Marc Hershman, President, Coastal Soc'y).
173. Id. at 484 (statement of Dr. Marc Hershman, President, Coastal Soc'y). The
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) has proved to be a flexible law that can handle
changing problems. For example, in 1976, the CZMA was used to deal with concerns of
state and local governments about the adverse impacts from OCS oil and gas development.
In 1978, the CZMA provided funds to renew the urban waterfront for recreation and tour
ism. Thus, in the past, CZMA's management capability has been efficiently used to address
new problems. If retained, this management capability could be expanded to address future
problems. If it is not retained, the nation will have to pay for an entire new management
framework sometime in the future. Id.
174. Id. at 485 (statement of Dr. Marc Hershman, President, Coastal Soc'y).
175. S. REP. No. 112, supra note 166, at 12.
176. Id,
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such litigation. 177
Moreover, limiting coastal state participation in oes policymak
ing violates the OeSLAA and the congressional intent behind its en
actment. One purpose of the OeSLAA is to involve coastal states and
local governments in policy planning for oes oil and gas develop
ment. 178 The OeSLAA itself acknowledges that offshore energy de
velopment may cause adverse impacts on coastal states and local
governments. 179 Therefore, coastal states and local governments are
to be. provided with comprehensive assistance to anticipate and ame
liorate the adverse impacts of oes oil and gas development. Such
assistance must include timely access to information, an opportunity
to participate in the formulation of policy and planning decisions, and
an opportunity to review and comment on final decisions. 18o
A strong system of coastal management and energy impact pro
grams would. benefit accelerated OCS development rather than deter
it. The termination of federal financial support for the eZM and eEl
programs would constitute "monumental bad faith on the part of the
[Reagan] administration and a continuation of the very short-sighted,
arrogant and negative approach of the Department of the Interior."181
D.

Environmental Concerns

Environmental concerns related to areawide leasing include the
possible inabi~ity of coastal states to assess and plan for the impacts of
oes development and the question of whether meaningful environ
177. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 48-49. See also S. REP. No. 112, supra note 166, at 12.
178. 43 U.S.C. § 1801(10)-(11) (1982). The House report on the OCSLA Amend
ments states:
A major purpose ... is to involve the states and affected local areas within the
States in the entire exploitation process to a greater degree. The bill provides an
opportunity for them to participate in the decisionmaking process with regard to
the overall leasing program of the Secretary, and individual development and pro
duction plans of the oil companies. The States and local areas are also supplied
with information so that they will be able to plan for and ameliorate the on-shore
consequences of off-shore development, and with assistance in coping with the on
shore impacts of such development. Involving States in the process from the be
ginning should avoid time-consuming lawsuits later.
H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 50, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS 1457.
179. 43 U.S.c. §§ 1332(4), 1801(10) (1982).
180. Id. §§ 1332(4), 1801(11), 1802(4)-(6) (1982).
181. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 285 (statement of Michael
Fischer, Executive Director, California Coastal Comm'n).
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mental impact statements can be prepared for entire planning areas. 182

1. Planning for the impacts of oes development
Critics of areawide leasing assert that the large, diverse areas of
fered for lease in areawide sales, normally 30 to 100 million acres, and
the uncertainty of which tracts will actually be leased, make it difficult
for coastal states and local governments to evaluate and plan for the
potential impacts from OCS development. 183 Areawide leasing has
been called "too much, too fast."184 An accurate assessment of im
pacts cannot be made since the potential impacts are difficult to iden
tify in such large areas. 185 The very breadth of the areawide
designation reduces the possibility that any particular locality will be
affected and diminishes planning by state governments as they may be
unwilling to allocate scarce resources to plan for impacts that are so
speculative that they are unlikely to occur. 186 It is argued that because
of the diversity in the environmental and socioeconomic characteris
tics of the nation's OCS areas, the DOl must identify the location of
proposed sales with greater specificity.187
This challenge to areawide leasing finds some statutory basis in
the OCSLAA. Section 18(a) of the OCSLAA requires the Secretary of
the Interior to develop a "schedule of proposed lease sales indicating,
as precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activ
ity."188 The specificity requirement in section 18(a) notifies state and
local governments of OCS activities off their coasts in order to allow
them time to prepare and plan for the accompanying impacts. 189
When Secretary Watt announced his areawide leasing plan, it was
challenged in court on the basis that the 1982-87 areawide leasing pro
182. House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't a/the Interior Appropriations-Part 5, supra
note 136, at 68-69.
183. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102-03 (statement
of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
184. OCS Leasing Process-Part 2: Hearings on the Five-Year Draft Proposed Pro
gram/or Oil and Gas Leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf, and the State/Federal Consul
tation Process, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings on OCS Leasing
Process-Part 2] (statement of Alice Ruby, on behalf of the Bristol Bay Coastal Resource
Servo Area Bd.).
185. Department a/the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations/or 1986: Hear
ings 0/ the Testimony of Public Witnesses. Department 0/ the Interior and Related Pro
grams-Part 8 Be/ore the Subcommittee on the Department 0/ the Interior and Related
Agencies a/the House Comm. on Appropriations. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1985) [hereinaf
ter House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't 0/ the Interior Appropriations-Part 8].
186. California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
187. Id. at 1303.
188. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982).
189. California V. Watt, 668 F.2d at 1304.
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gram lacked specificity190 since each planning area was scheduled as
one lease sale, even though only a portion of each area would actually
be leased. 191 In California v. Watt,192 the court rejected this argument
on the grounds that section 18(a) only required as much specificity "as
possible."193 The Secretary could not know what parts of a planning
area would be leased before a Call for Information was made and sub
sequent procedures were carried out. 194
The petitioners also argued that the large size of the planning ar
eas violated section 18(a) because it was impossible to determine the
size of the lease offerings. 195 The Watt court, referring to the language
of the OCSLAA, found that the plain words of the statute merely re
quired that the size known at the program stage be given as precisely
as possible. 196 There was nothing in the OCSLAA to limit the size of
lease offerings, so long as the size was identified to the best of the Sec
retary's knowledge. 197
Finally, the petitioners claimed that the Secretary's delegation to
industry of the responsibility to designate the areas which will actually
be leased violated the OCSLAA.198 This direct challenge to the area
wide leasing concept was also unsuccessful.I 99 The court reasoned
that the OCSLAA, a pyramidic statute, was designed to elicit input
from all parties having an interest in OCS development. 2OO The Call
for Information, which invites comments from states, local govern
ments, and concerned citizens, as well as from industry, was an exam
ple of such participation. 201 With the Watt court's rejection of these
arguments, the areawide leasing concept received judicial approval. 202
190.

California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 591-93 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 592.
192. 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
193. Id. at 592.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 592-93.
197. Id. at 592.
198. Id. at 593.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Vass I, supra note 35, at 77.
The decision in California v. Watt was not the first time the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia had reviewed a section 18(a) challenge to the designation of a broad
geographical area for lease sale planning. In 1981, a group challenged Secretary of the
Interior Cecil Andrus's five-year program for the sale ofOCS oil and gas leases. California
v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs argued that the designation of "Califor
nia" as the area for proposed lease sales 73 and 80 violated the specificity requirement of
section 18(a) of the OCSLAA. Id. at 1303. The plaintiffs argued, and Secretary Andrus
191.
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The quality of environmental assessments

Under areawide leasing, an areawide environmental impact state
ment (EIS) is prepared for the first sale in a planning area to assess the
effects of all oil and gas activity that might occur there. The EIS ex
amines the environment of the entire planning area and considers the
nonpetroleum-related activities which may be endangered by offshore
oil and gas activities. The EIS identifies alternatives to the proposed
development, including the deletion of environmentally sensitive areas
and the development of mitigating measures. 203 It emphasizes the ag
gregate impact of OCS oil and gas activity that would occur if all the
hydrocarbon resources in the planning area were developed. The EIS
assesses the expected cumulative effects that the DOl believes will oc
cur from the initial sale under study. Under the areawide EIS con
cept, the DOl has an early start on the environmental analysis since it
does not have to wait for the identification of specific tracts as was
previously necessary.204
The EIS prepared for subsequent offerings in a planning area up
dates the initial areawide EIS. This concept is called "tiering. "205 The
update includes the results of ongoing environmental studies and mon
conceded, that it would have been possible to designate with more precision the area of
offshore California in which the sales would occur. Id. at 1303-04. The court held that
since the Secretary had the information necessary to designate the area for sale more pre
cisely, the statute required him to do so. Id. at 1304. This 1981 holding can be reconciled
with the holding in the 1983 Watt case on the basis that the areawide leasing process often
does not enable the Secretary of the Interior to designate with precision the area in which
lease sales will occur. California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nonetheless,
the later case, taken as a whole, is considerably more deferential to the Secretary of the
Interior and substantially reduced the role ofjudicial review with respect to offshore oil and
gas lease sales. See Comment, The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Continuing Federal-State
Conflict in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20 WILLAMETfE L. REV. 83, 122 (1984) [hereinafter
The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited]; Kelly, Court Ruling Supports OCS Leasing Plan, OFF
SHORE, Oct. 1983, at 56-57.
203. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 17-18. See also Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part I, supra note 12, at 33-34 (state
ment of John Fields, Acting Manager, Pacific Outer Continental Shelf Office, Bureau of
Land Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
204. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part I, supra note 12, at 34 (statement of John
Fields, Acting Manager, Pacific Outer Continental Shelf Office, Bureau of Land Manage
ment, U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
205. Tiering involves sequential preparation of environmental impact statements
from a broad, programmatic to a lesser or site-specific scope. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1989).
For a discussion on the tiering of impact statements prepared on OCS lease sales, see Com
ment, The Tiering ofImpact Statements-Can the Process be Stopped Halfway?, 20 URB. L.
ANN. 197 (1980). For a case holding that site-specific reports are unnecessary where the
DOl has been reasonably diligent in preparing broader impact statements, see Get Oil Out,
Inc. v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 40 (C.D. Cal. 1979). See also supra notes 83-85 and accompa
nying text.
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itoring projects as well as information from any new exploration activ
ities. Each subsequent EIS is shorter and takes less time to prepare
than the initial areawide EIS.206 The DOl believes this change com
plies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations
which encourage agencies to tier their environmental impact state
ments to eliminate repetitive discussions and analysis,z07
Critics of areawide leasing assert that performing a meaningful
environmental analysis for areawide sales is not possible. 20s First, the
large size of the planning area makes detailed environmental analysis
impractical.209 The largest area previously analyzed under the tract
selection system in an OCS EIS was 3.4 million acres. 210 Second, the
DOl is unable to delete particularly sensitive tracts, because tract-spe
cific information is not available. General information for entire plan
ning areas does not assist in determining the need for tract-specific
lease stipulations. 2I I Third, the areawide EIS procedures place an in
creased burden on special interest groups to gather information for
tract deletions and lease stipulations. This responsibility belongs to
the DOl as trustee for the public lands. 212 Fourth, performing envi
ronmental analysis on OCS areas where there is little chance of discov
206. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales--Part 1, supra note 12, at 34.
207. OCS Oversight Hearings--Part 3, supra note 88, at 27; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28
(1989).
208. Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the Department of the Interior's Five
Year Leasing Plan-Part 2: Hearings on the Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales and the
Department ofthe Interior's Five- Year Leasing Plan Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 247-48 (1981-82) [hereinafter Hearings on OCS Lease Sales--Part 2] (statement of
Frances Beinecke, Senior Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
and Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hear
ings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102-03 (statement of Sarah Chasis,
Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hearings on OCS Leasing
Process-Part 2, supra note 184, at 132 (statement of Alice Ruby, on behalf of the Bristol
Bay Coastal Resource Servo Area Bd.).
209. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
210. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 7 n.21.
211. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hearings
on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 254 (statement of Frances Beinecke, Senior
Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Sarah Chasis, Senior
Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
212. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 257-58 (statement of
Frances Beinecke, Senior Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
and Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
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ering oil is a pointless effort and a waste of government resources. 213
It costs the DOl approximately $5 million to produce an EIS for an
OCS lease sale. 214 Finally, the reductions in the level of funding for
coastal management programs mean that financial resources will not
be available to adequately assess the environmental impacts of area
wide leasing. 2ls
The DOl stresses that prelease and postlease environmental regu
lations and state and local consultation are the same under areawide
leasing as under the tract nomination system. The steps and proce
dures required by NEPA to assess environmental impacts from OCS
leasing are being followed. 216 The industry believes that environmen
tal assessments under areawide leasing are better. Consideration of
larger areas may lead to a broader knowledge of geohazards, marine
biology, physical oceanography, and environmental baselines. Area
wide EISs recognize that most environmental studies are regional in
scope rather than site specific. 217
Despite the critics' claims, the areawide leasing concept does not
prevent the preparation of meaningful environmental analysis for lease
sales. Representatives of industry, coastal states and national environ
mental and fishery groups expressed little concern about the quality of
DOl's environmental assessments in a questionnaire sent by the Gen
eral Accounting Office. The questionnaire invited comments from
concerned groups about DOl's planning documents. The majority of
these groups believed that the documents are complete and contain
accurate information. 2ls Although DOl reduced the time for public
comment, most of these groups believe that they still have an adequate
213. Hearings on DeS Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
214. Hearings on DeS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 5. Between 1970 and
1984, the preparation of EIS's on the oil and gas leasing program cost the 001 approxi
mately $60 million. The actual cost is considerably higher. The figure cited only includes
staff salaries and printing costs and does not take into account money spent for environ
mental studies, hearings, and meetings for the sales. Hearings on DeS Leasing Process
Part J, supra note 98, at 86.
215. Hearings on DeS Leasing Process-Part 2, supra note 184, at 132 (statement of
Alice Ruby, on behalf of the Bristol Bay Coastal Resource Servo Area Bd.).
216. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 2-3.
217. Hearings on DeS, supra note 99, at 264.
218. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 46. The GAO sent questionnaires to 128 oil and gas companies, 23 coastal states, and 78
national environmental and fishery groups, inviting their comments on DOl's planning
process. Jd. at vii-viii. Of those states that responded, 52% stated that DOl's planning
documents were accurate and complete. Id. at 47. Only 22% of responding environmental
and fishery groups stated that one or more planning documents were incomplete. Jd. at 48.
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opportunity to participate. 219
E.

Fair Market Value

Section 18(a)(4) of the OCSLAA requires the Secretary of the In
terior to prepare and maintain a five-year OCS leasing program that
will assure the federal government receipt of fair market value for
leased tracts. 220 Areawide leasing floods the marketplace with large
lease offerings and changes the bid acceptance procedures formerly
used to determine fair market value. 221 Controversy has resulted from
the fact that the average bonus bid per acre has declined under the
areawide system and that fair market value may not be received for
leases under areawide offerings. 222
The OCSLAA leasing program is based on the premise that com
petition will provide a fair market value for the OCS tracts that are
leased. 223 The level of competition in the lease market may be assessed
in terms of the number of participating companies, the percentage of
Similarly, of the 105 companies responding to the questionnaire, only two stated that one
or more planning documents were incomplete. Id. at 48.
219. Id. at 48. The DOl reduced the minimum comment time to respond to its Call
for Information from 60 to 30 days. Of the states which commented, 81 % stated that they
had adequate time to respond. Id. at 49. However, only 16% of responding environmental
and fishery groups believed that the time allowed to respond to the Call for Information is
adequate. Id. There was no concern expressed by industry with the adequacy of the time
allowed for the Call for Information. Id. Similarly, the majority of affected states and
companies which responded stated that they had adequate time to comment on DOl's draft
EIS's, when time was reduced below the traditional 60 day comment period, but only 36%
of responding environmental groups said that the time was adequate. Id.
220. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (1982).
221. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 50.
222. Hearing on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 27. See also
Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of Sarah
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
The Interior Department has traditionally leased OCS lands for oil and gas develop
ment under a bonus bid, fixed royalty rate bidding system. Under this system, companies
submit cash bids, commonly called bonuses, for the right to explore and develop OCS
tracts. These bonuses are paid before exploration and are not refundable, regardless of
whether any oil or gas is eventually produced. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 132,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1538.
223. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.
EMD-77-19, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SALE No. 35
PROBLEMS SELECTING AND EVALUATING LAND TO LEASE 30 (1977) [hereinafter OCS
SALE 35]. For discussions on leasing federal mineral resources, see generally SMILEY,
COMPETITIVE BIDDING UNDER UNCERTAINTY, THE CASE OF OFFSHORE OIL (1979);
McDONALD, THE LEASING OF FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FUELS PRODUCTION (1979);
Gilley & Karels, The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding: New Evidence, 12 BELL J. EcON.
637 (1981); Gilley, Karels & Lyon, The Economics ofOil Lease Bidding, 18 Hous. L. REV.
1061 (1980-81); Logue, Sweeney & Willett, Optimal Leasing Policy for the Development of
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tracts receiving bids, the average number of bids per tract, and the
average dollar amount bid per acre. 224 Although the first two items
have not proven to be a problem in areawide leasing,225 the average
number of bids per tract and the average dollar amount bid per acre
have decreased with the implementation of areawide leasing. 226
1.

Increased Offerings-Flooding the Market?

The Comptroller General has repeatedly concluded that competi
tion is inadequate to assure receipt of fair market value when 49% or
more of the tracts receiving bids obtain only one or two bids. 227 Area
wide leasing, with its expanded lease offerings, has increased the
number of tracts receiving single bids. The number of bids per tract
has declined from an average of 2.4 bids for each tract in tract nomina
tion sales to 1. 7 bids for each tract in areawide sales. 228 The DOl
cancelled OCS Sale No. 82 in September 1984 when no industry bids
were received. 229 The large number of tracts receiving only one or two
bids230 is an indication that sufficient competition may not exist for the
government to receive fair market prices for much of the OCS acreage
Outer Continental Shelf Hydrocarbon Resources, 51 LAND EcON. 191 (1975); Reece, Com
petitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases, 9 BELL J. ECON. 369 (1978).
224. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.· GAO/RCED-83-9, OFF
SHORE LEASE SALE 59 AFFECTED BY DIFFERING VIEWS ON OIL AND GAS POTENTIAL 4
(1983) [hereinafter OCS SALE 59].
225. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 19, 22-24; Hagar, supra note 99, at 41.
226. See Crow, Dispute Over Area-wide Leasing Central to Oil Industry Access to
OCS Acreage, Oil & Gas J., Dec. 17, 1984, at 41-46.
. 227. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.
EMD-77-51, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SALE 4O-INAD
EQUATE DATA USED TO SELECT AND EVALUATE LANDS TO LEASE 27 (1977) [hereinafter
OCS SALE 40]; COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB.
No. EMD-79-22, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: GEORGIA EMBAYMENT-ILLUSTRATING
AGAIN THE NEED FOR MORE DATA BEFORE SELECTING AND LEASING OUTER CONTI·
NENTAL SHELF LANDS 10 (1979).
228. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREA WIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 18-19.
229. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMIT
TEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PUB. No.
GAO/RCED-83-9, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE SALE 82-SALE PREPARATION
AND SUBSEQUENT CANCELLATION 1 (1985) [hereinafter OCS SALE 82]. Critics of area
wide leasing point to the cancellation of Sale 82 as an example that the areawide leasing
system is not working. Crow, supra note 226, at 43. Industry, however, stated that the
main reason why companies did not bid was because of poor potential for oil and gas
discoveries in the North Atlantic. OCS SALE 82, supra, at 4-6.
230. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREA WIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 20.
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leased.231 The DOl itself has recognized that areawide leasing will
result in more tracts receiving fewer bids:
It is likely that substantially expanded leasing will result in lower

bids on average and perhaps lower bids for some tracts than they
would bring under a more restrictive leasing program. . . . Ex
panded lease offerings are also likely to result in more tracts receiv
ing only 1 or 2 bids and perhaps even in fewer bids on the better
prospects. 232
Even oil industry commentators acknowledged that the average
number of bids per tract would decrease in areawide leasing. 233
However, both DOl and industry maintain that competition for
OCS oil and gas leases is much greater than indicated by the average
number of bids received per tract. 234 Ofthe tracts offered in lease sales
from 1954-76,39% received only one bid, but these tracts yielded only
10% of total bonus value and accounted for only 17% of the total
value of production. Similarly, 19% of the tracts received two bids
and produced 8% of the total bonus value. These slightly improved
prospects provided about 16% of the total value of production. The
remaining 42% of tracts offered received three or more bids and gen
erated 82% of the bonus value. The total value of production for these
better prospects was a disproportionately high 64%.235 This finding
indicates that although many tracts have been leased with only one or
two bids, these low competition leases were of marginal economic
value. Conversely, most of the production came from tracts that had
strong competition and generated high bonuses. Competition for
leases is determined more by the hydrocarbon potential of the tract
offered than the size of the lease sale. 236
A study for the state of Texas, however, concluded that the re
duction in competition, defined as the number of bids per tract, was
the direct result of areawide leasing and the oversupply of acreage of
231. Hearings on oes Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 521 (statement of
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
232. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 2 FINAL
SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: PROPOSED FIVE-YEAR
OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE SCHEDULE, JANUARY 1982-DECEMBER 1986 859
(undated).
233. Hearings on oes Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 521 (statement of
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
234. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 57.
235. Id. at 56.
236. 1d.
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fered. 237 The General Accounting Office also found that the change
from the tract selection process to areawide leasing has reduced the
number of bids received for individual tracts. Furthermore, the GAO
results indicated that the number of bids received per tract signifi
cantly affected the amount of the high bid per acre received by the
federal government. On average, each additional bid per acre is asso
ciated with about a $1,082 increase in the amount of the high bid re
ceived for each acre of OCS land. 238
Another point of debate is whether the areawide concept should
be abandoned because the average bonus bid per acre has declined by
about 75% since the beginning of areawide leasing. 239 The average bid
per acre for lease sales from November 30, 1979 to September 30, 1984
decreased from $2,624 per acre in tract nomination sales to $686 per
acre in areawide sales. 240 By OCS region, the average bid per acre
leased declined from $1,793 to $664 in Alaska, from $1,619 to $299 in
the Atlantic, from $3,099 to $702 in the Gulf of Mexico, and from
$4,628 to $366 in the Pacific. 241
In response to these figures, the DOl and industry maintain that
areawide leasing is not responsible for the decline in the average bid
per acre. There are good reasons for industry to offer less than it once
did per OCS acre, regardless of the type of leasing system used. These
reasons include: the failure of industry to find oil and gas in highly
promising areas of the Atlantic and Alaska regions; the inferior qual
ity of the remaining offerings; and the location of many of the tracts in
deepwater and frontier areas where operating costs are high.242 In ad
237.
at 21.

238.
239.

EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,

Id. at 22.
Hearings on

oes Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 75, 122 (statement
of Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United
States, Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.); Important oes Issue
Hung Up on Minor Point: Bids Per Acre, Oil & Gas J., Dec. 17, 1984, at 39. See also Lack
of Bids for Whale Pasture Doesn't Invalidate Area- Wide Leasing, Oil & Gas J., Oct. 22,
1984, at 55; To Boost oes Bidding, Extend Termsfor Leases in Deep Water, Oil & Gas J.,
July 16, 1984, at 23; Decline in Bids per oes Acre No Reason to Scrap Area-Wide Sales, Oil
& Gas J., May 7, 1984, at 71; Low Bids May Cause Revision ofArea-Wide oes Sales, Oil &
Gas J., Apr. 30, 1984, at 40.
240. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 22. See also Hearing on the Five-Year oes Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 27; Hear
ings on oes Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 102 (statement of Sarah Chasis,
Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
241. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 22.
242. Important oes Issue Hung Up on Minor Point: Bids Per Acre, supra note 239,
at 39; Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 75, 122 (statement of
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dition, areawide sales have included a combination of high-value and
low-value tracts,. with the result that the average bid would logically
be lower than bids received in tract nomination sales. 243 Industry also
asserts that the critics of areawide leasing focus too much attention on
the up-front bonus which companies pay the federal government for
an OCS lease. The United States will receive more money from the
expedited production of OCS reserves and the revenues it generates in
royalties and taxes than from the up-front bonuses. The royalty and
tax increases will more than offset the decline in bonuses per acre. 244
Finally, the DOl and industry maintain that the decline in bid per
acre is primarily the result of the drop in the price of oil. While the
depressed world oil market is in part responsible for low lease bids, the
decline greatly exceeds the degree to which the international price of
oil has fallen. In 1985, the bid levels in some sales dropped 90% from
their high levels ofjust a few years ago, while the world price of oil has
declined about 12% since reaching its high in 1981.245
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the decline in bonuses per
acre will be offset by earlier receipt of royalties, rents and taxes or by
increased production. As of the end of fiscal year 1984, bonuses had
comprised about 67% of the total direct revenues received by the fed
eral government since OCS leasing began in 1954. Royalties and rents
accounted for most of the remaining 33% of direct revenues. 246

2.

DOl's New Process for Evaluating Industry Bids

In addition to flooding the marketplace with lease offerings, the
accelerated OCS program changed the evaluation procedure that the
DOl had used in the past to determine whether the bids received con
stituted fair market value. Under the traditional procedure, economic,
geological, and engineering data on the sale area were gathered before
each sale. A detailed economic evaluation was prepared from this inDan Chappell, Diy. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States,
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.); Hearings on OCS Five- Year Pro
gram, supra note 99, at 205-09.
243. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 122 (statement of
Dan Chappell, Diy. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States,
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.).
244. Hearings on OCS Five-Year Program, supra note 99, at 203. See also Hagar,
supra note 99, at 40.
245. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 413 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director,
Oceans, Coast, and Public Lands Project, on behalf of the Enytl. Policy Inst.).
246. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 24, 26.

48

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1

formation for every tract offered for lease,247 and a minimum accepta
ble bid for each tract was determined prior to the sale. After the sale,
industry bids were compared with the presale tract evaluations, and
only those bids meeting or exceeding the DOl's assigned values could
be accepted. 248
This detailed analysis slowed leasing of OCS tracts. Recognizing
that it would be impossible to perform a detailed analysis on every
tract offered under the areawide concept, the DOl changed the tract
evaluation procedure. Under the new evaluation procedure, tracts are
no longer evaluated before a sale. Instead, bids are analyzed after they
are received by a two-phase evaluative process that relies more heavily
on the marketplace to determine fair market value. 249 Because the
OCSLAA does not explicitly define fair market value, the DOl
adopted the common law definition. Common law defines fair market
value as the price that a knowledgeable and willing seller would accept
from a knowledgeable and willing but not obligated buyer.25o
In phase one of the new process, the tracts receiving bids are sep
arated into three categories. These categories include: (1) tracts re
ceiving nonprospective bids; (2) tracts where opportunities for
strategic underbidding, information asymmetry,251 collusion, and
other noncompetitive practices might occur, and where the govern
ment has the most detailed and reliable data; and (3) tracts where
competitive market forces can be relied upon to assure fair market
value. 252 Within these categories, high bids on all tracts classified as
drainage and development tracts 253 are referred directly to phase two
for further evaluation. All legal high bids on non prospective tracts are
247. Hearings on oes Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 522-23 (statement of
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
248. OCS SALE 59, supra note 224, at 10.
249. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 28-30.
250. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PROCEDURES FOR
OCS BID ADEQUACY, INCLUDING THE FINAL REPORT OF THE OCS FAIR MARKET
VALUE TASK FORCE at i (1983) [hereinafter PROCEDURES FOR OCS BID ADEQUACY). See
also California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1983); EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's
AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, at 30-32; HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY
WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 52; OCS SALE 59, supra note
224, at 10-11; oes Leasing Proposal Keyed to Market Forces, supra note 79; Reagan Energy
Policy Plan Tied to Free Market, supra note 79; Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part J,
supra note 98, at 75.
251. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 52. Nonprospective tracts are those in which oil and gas probably do not exist, or
from which oil and gas are not economically recoverable. Id. at 52 n.146.
252. Id. at 52.
253. Id. "Development and drainage tracts are located near tracts with proven pro
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accepted. After anomalously low bids have been screened out, high
bids are accepted for any prospective tract that received three or more
bids, that received more than the average number of bids on prospec
tive tracts in the entire sale, or for which the geometric average bonus
bid254 for the tract is in the upper 50th percentile for those prospective
tracts receiving bids. 255
All bids which are not accepted under the phase one criteria un
dergo a more detailed analysis in phase two. This analysis is the same
as that performed on all tracts under the old procedure. The DOl
estimates that approximately 55% of the bids on prospective tracts are
accepted in phase one of the new evaluation procedure. 256
This new procedure facilitates accelerated leasing which in turn
results in a short-term increase in annual revenues to the federal gov
ernment. This increase, however, may be offset by future long-term
losses to the Treasury.257 The Sierra Club has calculated that the fed
eral government will lose approximately $76.89 billion in OCS lease
revenues if all the remaining oil and gas reserves are leased under the
procedure developed for the areawide OCS program. 258 The depres
sion of bid levels below fair market value will result in a loss of $53.5
duction." They are given more detailed analysis because holders of nearby tract leases may
possess more information than other bidders. Id. at 52 n.148.
254. Id. at 52. A geometric average bonus bid is the mean of all bids on a tract. Id.
at 52 n.149.
255. Id. at 52. For an overview of tract bid evaluation procedures, see PROCEDURES
FOR OCS BID ADEQUACY, supra note 250; Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1,
supra note 98, at 75-76; EARLY AsSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM,
supra note 96, at 92-100.
256. PROCEDURES FOR OCS BID ADEQUACY, supra note 250, at 5.
257. EARLY AssESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 18. For discussions on revenue losses from leasing OCS lands, see generally Grayson,
Canaday, Brumbaugh, Sherman & Sutherland, Issues of Competition on the Outer Conti
nental Shelf, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 69 (1983); Mead, Moesidjord & Sorensen, Com

petition in Outer Shelf Oil and Gas Lease Auctions: A Statistical Analysis of Winning Bids,
26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 95 (1986); Shapiro, Sagebrush and Seaweed Robbery: State Reve
nue Losses From Onshore and Offshore Federal Lands, 12 EcOLOGY L.Q. 481 (1985).
Areawide leasing is not the only reason why the federal government is losing revenues
from public lands. The deficiencies in DOl's oil and gas royalty collections have resulted in
losses of millions of dollars owed to the United States from industry lessees. COMPTROL
LER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, OIL AND GAS ROYALTY COLLECTIONS-SERIOUS FINANCIAL MAN
AGEMENT PROBLEMS NEED CONGRESSIONAL ATTENTION (1979); GENERAL ACCOUNT
ING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, INTERIOR'S MINERALS
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS NEED CONSOLIDATION TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
CONTROL (1982).
258. SIERRA CLUB, supra note 46, at 14; Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2,
supra note 208, at 532 (statement of Carl Pope, Assistant Conservation Director, Sierra
Club), and at 580-83 (DOl's response); HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR
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billion over time. 259 According to the Sierra Club's calculations, the
new bid evaluation procedure will cost taxpayers an additional $23.4
billion. 260 Even the DOl calculated that the areawide concept could
cost the public $5 billion in lost revenues through 1987. 261
According to some sources, these projected losses are now being
verified. In a statistical analysis for the first ten areawide sales be
tween April 1983 and September 1984, the GAO indicated that chang
ing to the areawide program resulted in an average reduction in bids of
$541 per acre leased, or $3.1 million for each tract leased. 262
Although the federal government received $8.9 billion in total bids,
the GAO analysis concluded that this amount was about $7 billion (a
discounted value of $5.4 billion) less than the United States would
have received if the slower pace of the prior tract nomination program
had been followed. 263 The areawide system and massive dumping of
leases on the market have driven down the value of state offshore
leases as well, resulting in lost revenue to coastal states. 264
Another major area of economic concern was the cost-benefit
analysis underlying the accelerated scheduling of sales. In formulating
the timing of individual lease sales, the DOl considered only the value
of expected petroleum resources in 1982, giving no consideration to
the change in value of those resources over time:
In essence, [the Department of the Interior's] approach to leasing is
to immediately dispose of any of those resources which have any
value at all. . . . This methodology ignores the obvious fact-that
OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 55-60; OCS Lease Plan Seen Costing u.s. $77.28
Billion, Oil & Gas J., Sept. 27, 1982, at 114.
259. SIERRA CLUB, supra note 46, at 8.
260. Id. at 12.
261. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 522-23 (statement of
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
262. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 18, 22-24, See also Peterson, Billions Seen Lost in Offshore Leasing: GAO Says Watt
Scheme Cut Competition, Washington Post, July 30, 1985, at AI7, col. I. The DOl and
industry strongly disagreed with GAO's conclusions, maintaining that the decrease in OCS
revenues was largely the result of the decline in oil prices and quality of tracts offered,
including deepwater offerings. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BRIEFING REPORT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS,
VIEWS ON INTERIOR'S COMMENTS TO GAO REPORTS ON LEASING OFFSHORE LANDS
(1986).
263. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 18. Because it would have taken the DOl longer to lease the same amount ofOCS lands
under the tract nomination system, the $7 billion loss was discounted 6.5% in 1984 dollars
to reflect the time value of money. [d. at 24.
264. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 2, supra note 184, at 257-58.
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any rational owner of resources would recognize-that delaying the
disposition of resources until sometime in the future is economically
preferable if the value is expected to rise sufficiently in the
interim.265
In calculating the costs and benefits of delaying lease sales, the
DOl assumed a 1% annual real price increase. This projected low rate
of increase significantly underestimated the benefits of delaying certain
lease sales, including those in Alaska. 266
The areawide leasing concept has decreased competition in the
lease market;267 nevertheless, the DOl is placing increased reliance on
that market to assure receipt of fair market value for the disposal of
publicly owned resources. 268 In fact, large acreage offerings and in
creased sale frequency have reduced competition and bid revenues for
individual tracts.269 The possible effects of Secretary Watt's acceler
ated leasing plan can be inferred from the results of a previous attempt
in 1973 to accelerate OCS leasing. In that instance, competition de
clined as the acreage offered increased. The Watt accelerated leasing
program, like the one in 1973, has significantly reduced competition
for OCS tracts. 270 Furthermore, the introduction of areawide leasing
occurred at a time when the market for petroleum products was soft.
The worldwide glut of oil and gas depresses the demand for OCS
leases and reduces the return the public receives for these resources. 271
Coastal states do not receive funds directly from federal OCS
lease activity.272 Nonetheless, states benefit indirectly when public re
sources are sold for their true value. 273 Selling public resources at a
lower price is inconsistent with a national fiscal policy devoted to bal
ancing the budget and lowering taxes. 274 Indeed, Secretary Watt's ac
265. Hearings on oes Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 527 (statement of
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
266. Id. at 528. The one percent figure was taken from the low growth range predic
tion of a study done by the Resource Consulting Group (RCG). The RCG determined that
the most likely growth rate was 2.5 to 3.5% per year. Id. at 528-29. The Department of
Energy predicted a 3% growth rate. Id. At a 3% rate, it was beneficial to delay leasing in
six lease areas of offshore Alaska that have sensitive resources. Id. at 529 n.1.
267. EARLY AssESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 18.
268. Id. at 1-2.
269. Id. at 18.
. 270. NAT'L OCEAN POL'y STUD., supra note 156, at 4-5, 17-25.
271. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year oes Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 8 (state
ment of Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio).
272. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1496.
273. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 2, supra note 184, at 258.
274. Id.; oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 277.
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celerated areawide leasing program has been characterized as "the
most monumental giveaway in the Nation's history."275

3.

Compliance with OCSLAA's Fair Market Value
Requirement

Just as the issue of compliance with section 18(a) of the OCSLAA
was raised,276 the issue of receipt of fair market value for OCSLAA
resources was raised in a court challenge to Secretary Watt's areawide
leasing plan. In California v. Watt,277 the petitioners challenged the
Secretary's program, claiming that it failed to assure receipt of fair
market value for offshore resources. They argued that areawide leas
ing and the accelerated rate of leasing combined to depress the value
of bonus bids. Consequently, they argued that the federal government
was not receiving the fair market value of the lands leased as required
by the OCSLAA.278
The court found that even if the petitioners' claims were correct,
it would not mean that the Secretary had violated the OCSLAA. The
court upheld the areawide leasing program, noting that the OCSLAA
does not require a maximization of revenues, only the receipt of a fair
return for federal leases. 279 Secretary Watt had determined that the
supply and demand conditions existing at the time of the lease sale,
along with a process of competitive sealed bidding and the bid evalua
tion process, would be sufficient to ensure a fair return. 280 The court
held that the Secretary's reliance on these factors was a reasonable
means of ensuring receipt of fair market value for OCS lands and com
plied with the OCSLAA.281
The Watt court's decision was incorrect. 282 Although the
275. Senate Hearings on the Five-Year DCS Leasing Plan, supra note 34, at 9 (state
ment of Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio).
276. See supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
277. 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
278. Id. at 606. For a discussion on the receipt of fair market value in the Watt
litigation, see Fitzgerald, California v. Watt: Congressional Intent Bows to Judicial Re
straint, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 147, 194-97 (19~7).
279. California v. Watt, 712 F.2d at 606.
280. Id. at 606-08.
281. Id. at 608.
282. See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 162 (1981). See also
Energy Action Educ. Found. v. Andrus, 631 F.2d 751, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[T]he appro
priate standard appears to be that leases must insure a 'fair and equitable return.' "). For
discussion of these cases, see Comment, Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation:
Secretarial Discretion to Select Lease Bidding Systems, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 163
(1983).
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OCSLAA does not explicitly define fair market value,283 the Act re
quires the Secretary to conduct the OCS leasing program in order "to
assure receipt of fair market value for the lands leased and the rights
conveyed by the Federal Government."284 One of the stated purposes
of the OCSLAA was "to preserve and maintain free enterprise compe
tition. "285 The Secretary is charged with the duties of a trustee over
the public lands. An important responsibility of the Secretary as
trustee is to insure "that the public interest is served by exacting a fair .
return on behalf of the government from the persons engaged in ex
ploiting its resources."286
The California v. Watt decision fails to account for the new em
phasis on receipt of fair market value in the OCSLAA.287 The 1953
version of the OCSLA did not mention fair market value. It provided
that in order to meet urgent need for further exploration and develop
ment of the oil and gas resources of the OCS, "the Secretary is author
ized to grant to the highest responsible qualified bidder or bidders by
competitive bidding ... oil and gas lease[s] [on the OCS]."288 The
1978 amendments added the fair market value requirement and
changed the Act's emphasis, adding the fair market value requirement
as a congressional purpose on an equal footing with those of energy
development and environmental protection. 289 In addition to the gen
eral fair market value requirement of the OCSLAA, other sections of
the Act also support a strict interpretation of fair market value. For
example, among the congressional findings is a statement that "the
Outer Continental Shelf contains significant quantities of oil and natu
ral gas and is a vital national resource reserve which must be carefully
managed so as to realize fair value, to preserve and maintain competi
tion, and to reflect the public interest."29o The legislative history of
the OCSLAA emphasizes the congressional intent to assure the receipt
of fair market value for leasing OCS lands. The House report accom
panying the 1978 amendments states: "[L]easing activities, including
the scheduling of lease sales and the amount to be included in the lease
sales, should assure receipt to the Government of fair market value for
283.
at 30.
284.

285.

EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
43 U.S.c. § 1344(a)(4) (1982).
Id. § 1802(2)(D).

286.

Hannifin v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200, 202 (10th Cir. 1971).

287.

See Note, Sales of Federal Fuel Resources: AchieVing "Fair Market Value", 9

COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 237, 253-54, 257 (1984).
288. 43 U.S.c. § 1337(a)(I) (1982).
289. Id. § 1344(a)(4) (1982).
290. Id. § 1801(7).
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our public resources."291 Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that Congress, in passing the OCSLAA, "com
mitted the Government to the goal of obtaining fair market value for
OCS oil and gas resources. The 1978 Amendments themselves pro
claim this intention, and the legislative history is replete with refer
ences to this purpose."292 The Watt court ignored the clear
congressional intent to emphasize the receipt of fair market value for
leasing OCS lands and incorrectly upheld implementation of Secretary
Watt's areawide leasing concept.
Although fair market value is one of the most difficult concepts to
define in federal res~urce leasing policy, the federal government
should not offer to lease so much acreage that an already depressed
market will be flooded. 293 Areawide leasing and an accelerated leasing
schedule have jeopardized the assurance that the government will re
ceive a fair market value return on leases of OCS lands. 294 Some DOl
officials argue that overestimating the value of OCS resources is ulti
mately more costly than underestimating resource values because
overestimating the value of OCS lands may result in acreage not being
leased and developed, since the high bid is less than the government
estimate. These officials argue that receipt of fair market value is sec
ondary to the national policy of developing offshore resources. 295 The
argument fails to note that OCS lands are public resources and that it
is the government's responsibility to assure that they are not leased to
industry for less than what they are worth. 296 It also ignores the
291. H.R. REP. No. 590, supra note 8, at 149, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 1555.
292. Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. lSI, 162 (1981).
293. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 411 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director,
Oceans, Coast and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). Secretary Watt was also
criticized for leasing coal reserves without receiving fair market value. On April 28, 1982,
the 001 held the largest federal coal lease sale in the nation's history. It offered about 1.6
billion tons of coal reserves in the Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana. The sale
results were controversial. DOl's offer to lease so much coal in a depressed market raised
questions as to whether a fair return was received for coal leases. See COMPTROLLER GEN
ERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-83-119, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS, ANALYSIS OF THE POWDER RIVER BASIN FEDERAL COAL LEASE SALE:
ECONOMIC VALUATION IMPROVEMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES NEEDED 1 (1983).
GAO found that the amount received from the leases was about $100,000,000 less than
estimates of fair market value. Id. at 25.
294. OCS SALE 35, supra note 223, at 1; EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREA
WIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96, at 18.
295. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, PUB. No. RED-75-359,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS DEVELOP
MENT-IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN DETERMINING WHERE TO LEASE AND AT WHAT
DOLLAR VALUE 16-17 (1975).

296.

Id.
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OCSLAA mandate to emphasize the receipt of fair market value in
leasing OCS lands as coequal with development and environmental
protection. 297

III.

CONGRESSIONAL LEASING MORATORIA

The Reagan administration's continued support for the areawide
leasing concept and its refusal to delete areas of environmental sensi
tivity and economic importance from lease sales was perceived by
coastal states and environmental groups as a resource program
weighted heavily toward energy production, irrespective of legitimate
state concerns for balanced OCS development. 298 The administra
tion's opposition to continued funding for state coastal management
programs, OCS revenue sharing, and consistency requirements led
states and local citizens to conclude that they were taking all the risks
of OCS activity but receiving none of the benefits in return. 299 These
factors, combined with pressure from the Department of Defense for
deletions of tracts for military uses 300 and growing concern over the
receipt of fair market value, prompted Congress to impose leasing
moratoria on areas of the OCS.301
The total area in all moratoria enacted in the various appropria
tions acts from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal year 1989 has increased
297. 43 u.s.c. § 1344(a)(4) (1982).
298. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 2-3; Hearings on OCS,
supra note 99, at 399 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Project Scientist, Natural Resources
Defense Council); Offshore Oil and Gas Oversight: Hearings on Moratoria on Offshore Oil
and Gas Leases Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 118-24 (1984) [here
inafter Hearings on OCS Moratoria] (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans,
Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).
299. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 399 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Project
Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra
note 298, at 24. See supra notes 159-81 and accompanying text.
300. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 48-56, 292-96; Hearings on OCS,
supra note 99, at 399-400 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Project Scientist, Natural Re
sources Defense Council, Inc.).
301. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 399-400 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior
Project Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.); Hearings on OCS Moratoria,
supra note 298, at 124-27 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and
Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.). Leasing moratoria have been enacted by placing
restrictions on the annual Interior appropriation acts on spending funds for the purpose of
prelease preparation on holding certain lease sales. Department ofthe Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1989-Part 6: Hearings of the Testimony of Public Witnesses
Before the Subcomm. on the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988) [hereinafter House Hearings on
the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 6]; Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102,
at 82 (statement of William Clark, Secretary of the Interior).
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from 736,000 acres to 25.7 million acres annually, totalling approxi
mately 181 million acres. Proposals are pending in Congress to extend
the existing moratoria and add additional acres to those already re
stricted. 302 There are also proposals to prohibit leasing in some OCS
areas along the coasts of California and Massachusetts until the year
2000. 303
A.

The Rationale for Leasing Moratoria

Coastal states, local governments, and environmental groups have
supported the leasing moratoria304 claiming that the limitations were
modest and focused on areas of great environmental sensitivity which
the DOl was unwilling to protect. 305 The moratorium areas have sig
nificant environmental assets in fisheries, habitats for endangered
marine species, and coastal-related tourism. 306 Georges Bank, in the
North Atlantic planning area, is one of the most productive fishing
areas in the world, supporting over 40,000 jobs in New England and
sustaining a fishing industry of over $1 billion annually. 307 Included
302. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, !jupra note 102, at 82-83 (statement of Wil
liam Clark, Secretary of the Interior).
303. See Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 260 (statement of
Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, National Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Lisa
Speer, Resource Specialist, National Resources Defense Council, Inc.). See also Considera
tion ofLegislation to Restrict the Department of the Interior's Oil and Gas Leasing Program
on the Outer Continental Shelf: Hearings on HR. 2059 Before the Subcomm. on Mining,
Forest Management, and Bonneville Power Administration of the House Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-12 (1984); House Hearings on the 1989 DOl
Appropriations-Part 6, supra note 301, at 239-42.
304. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 325 (statement of Representative Leon
Panetta of California); Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 165-79 (statement of
C. Deming Cowles, Washington Representative, United Fishermen of Alaska), at 211-25
(statement of John Paul Jones, Vice President, Bering Sea Fisherman's Ass'n). The major
ity of the California congressional delegation, including Senators, the state's Attorney Gen
eral, and the majority of its coastal cities and counties have expressed their strong support
for a continuation of the moratorium. Perhaps most important, in 1984, both bodies of the
state legislature approved Joint Resolution 42, which calls for a five-year prohibition on
OCS leasing of all California's moratorium areas. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 325
26 (statement of Representative Leon Panetta of California).
305. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 325-26 (statement of Representative Leon
Panetta of California); Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 252-61 (state
ment of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney and Lisa Speer, Resource Specialist, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
306. Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 326-27 (statement of Representative Leon
Panetta of California); Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 252-60 (state
ment of Sarah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney and Lisa Speer, Resource Specialist, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
307. Hearing on OCS LeaSing Activities, supra note 102, at 252-60 (statement of Sa
rah Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Lisa Speer,
Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
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in the California moratorium is the pristine Big Sur coastline, as well
as communities dependent on the state's $16 billion fishing and tour
ism industries. 308 These industries would be severely damaged by
chronic oil discharges, the visual pollution of offshore platforms, and
most destructive of all, a major oil spill into the marine
environment.309
The impact on overall acreage made available to industry for
lease and on petroleum production is claimed to be minimaJ.3 \0 The
fiscal year 1984 prohibition represented approximately 8.5% ofthe es
timated hydrocarbon resources which were scheduled to be offered in
that year. 311 Areas within the leasing moratoria in fiscal year 1986
contained only 8% of the nation's overall OCS reserves and 5% of the
total OCS acreage eligible for lease. 312 Even with the moratoria in
1986, more than 170 million OCS acres containing over 70% of the
United States total estimated OCS hydrocarbon reserves were avail
able for lease during that fiscal year alone. 313
Supporters of OCS leasing moratoria also claim that the prohibi
tion does not threaten the nation's energy security, employment, or
the economy in general. 314 Since the imposition of leasing moratoria
in 1982, the economy has improved, unemployment has decreased, oil
prices have fallen, and OCS leasing, drilling rig utilization, and pro
duction have risen. 315 Since the amount of oil in the moratoria areas is
so small--only 8% of total OCS estimated reserves-lifting the re
striction would have a minimal impact on United States energy
security.316
Moreover, in spite of its rhetoric of national energy independence,
the Reagan administration pursued policies which were fundamentally
inconsistent with the drive for that goal. The administration's 1986
308. [d. at 254-56; Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 326-27 (statement of Repre
sentative Leon Panetta of California).
309. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 327. See also id. at 393-402 (statement of
Lisa Speer, Senior Project Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
310. Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 261 (statement of Sarah
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Lisa Speer,
Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
311. [d. at 251-52.
312. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 400-01 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior
Project Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
313. [d. at 328 (statement of Representative Leon Panetta of California).
314. [d. at 401 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Project Scientist, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.).
315. [d.
316. [d.; Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 266-67 (statement of
Elizabeth Raisbeck, Legislative Director, Friends of the Earth).
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fiscal year budget proposals included discontinuing purchases for the
strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), the nation's first line of defense
against disruptions in foreign petroleum supplies. The budget propo
sal would have left the SPR more than 250 million barrels short of the
650 million barrel goal established by Congress. The administration
also proposed drastic budget cuts for programs which are vital to a
comprehensive national energy independence strategy, including fossil
fuel research, solar and renewable energy research, and energy
conservation. 3 17
Furthermore, it was argued, a leasing moratorium would not
harm the employment of minorities. In 1984, only 4.3% of those em
ployed in the crude petroleum and natural gas extraction industry
were black. However, in those industries most likely to be impacted
by OCS activities-the fishing, hotel, and restaurant industries
blacks account for 8.8%, 16.5% and 9.7% of the respective work
forces. 318 The American steel industry has not been affected by the
moratoria. A recent United States Trade Commission report stated
that of ten contracts for offshore oil platforms put out for bid since
1979, only one has been awarded to a domestic fabricator. 319
Advocates of leasing moratoria, therefore, maintain that a careful
balancing of resource potential against environmental risk weighs in
favor of imposing moratoria on the environmentally sensitive and pro
ductive areas of the United States' OCS.320 Supporters ofleasing mor
atoria feel that such restrictions are necessary and will continue to be
necessary until a more rational and balanced OCS program has been
instituted. 321
B.

The Drawbacks of Leasing Moratoria

The Department of the Interior322 and the offshore oil and gas
industry have objected to the imposition of congressional leasing mor
atoria, claiming that these prohibitions undermine both the national
317. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 329 (statement of Representative Leon
Panetta of California).
318. [d. at 336.
319. Id. at 336-37.
320. Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 248-50 (statement of Lisa
Speer, Resource Specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
321. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 330-33 (statement of Representative Leon
E. Panetta of California); Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 115, 118 (state
ment of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy
Inst.).
322. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 46 (statement of Garrey E. Car
ruthers, Assistant Secretary, Land & Minerals Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
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security and economic well-being of the United States. 323 Former Sec
retary of the Interior Clark stated that the moratoria effectively re
pealed the OCSLAA and that he "should consider closing MMS and
spending [his] time among the other nine ... [DOl] bureaus!"324 The
petroleum industry has negatively characterized the effect of the mora
toria: "If a foreign power had managed to do to us what we have done
to ourselves, to shape our energy policy so disastrously, we would call
it an act of war."325
The worst single effect of leasing moratoria has been the disrup
tion of exploration continuity in OCS areas, adding additional delay to
an already lengthy process. 326 Developing a single OCS well can take
as long as ten to fifteen years from the time of exploration activities to
production. 327 Uncertainty about whether particular areas will or will
not be available for lease creates confusion and inefficiency in industry
leasing decisions. Industry must invest millions of dollars to deter
mine where to spend scarce capital bidding on a tract if it becomes
available for lease; now the area may later be included in a leasing
moratorium. 328 Leasing moratoria prevent the DOl from determining
the hydrocarbon potential of these areas; therefore, the energy policies
of the United States are based on incomplete information. 329 Explora
323. Id. at 228 (statement of C.B. Wheeler, Senior Vice President, Exxon Co.,
U.S.A., representing Am. Petroleum Inst.). The petroleum industry has extensively edito
rialized against the moratoria. See generally Fine Line Between Issues, Oil & Gas J., Apr.
18, 1988, at 20; OCS: A Familiar Issue, Oil & Gas J., Mar. 21, 1988, at 28; Showdowns
Loom on California OCS, Oil & Gas J., Mar. 2, 1987, at 27; Moratorium Sidestepped, Oil &
Gas J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 23; Moratorium Renewed, Oil & Gas J., July 21, 1986, at 30;
Williams, Environmental Objections Block Important West Coast Oil Work, Oil & Gas J.,
Apr. 21, 1986, at 17-22; Moratorium Loses, Oil & Gas J., Dec. 2, 1985, at 50; Groups Hit
OCS Leasing Moratoriums, Oil & Gas J., Apr. I, 1985, at 66; Simultaneous Leasing Escapes
Congressional Axe-This Time, Oil & Gas J., July 2, 1984, at 17; Moratoriums Seen Lock
ing Up Big OCS Resource, Oil & Gas J., June 18, 1984, at 92; Concern Over Environment or
Economic Obstructionism?, Oil & Gas J., Feb. 13, 1984, at 31; Congress Subverts its Own
OCS Development Mandate by Denying Funds for Lease Sales, Oil & Gas J., Nov. 28, 1983,
at 39.
324. Hearing on OCS LeaSing Activities, supra note 102, at 117.
325. House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't of the Interior Appropriations-Part 5, supra
note 136, at 202 (statement of Robert E. Harris, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Nat'l Supply Co.). The controversy over leasing moratoria has even involved senior citizen
groups. The National Alliance of Senior Citizens opposed the prohibition, claiming that
elderly consumers who live on fixed incomes cannot afford rising energy costs or energy
shortages that may subject seniors to debilitating illnesses. Id. at 182-85.
326. Hearing on OCS LeaSing Activities, supra note 102, at 336 (statement of Atlantic
Richfield Co. on Moratoria Affecting Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS).
327. /d. at 180 (statement of Max G. Pitcher, Vice President, N. Am. Exploration,
Conoco, Inc., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.).
328. Id. at 179-80.
329. Hearings on OCS LeaSing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 120 (statement of
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tion continuity is also necessary in order to pursue promising geologic
basins. Although leasing moratoria have prohibited exploration in
only a relatively small portion of the total United States OCS, it is the
nearshore, shallow areas closed to exploration by moratoria that offer
the greatest potential for discovering economically viable oil and gas
reserves.330
Some advocates of leasing moratoria claim that one-year delays
have no significant effect on future energy production. However,
when those prohibitions are extended and expanded annually, the de
lay undermines this country's prospects for energy security. In addi
tion, new oil and gas supplies will take longer to deliver to American
consumers.331 If the areas prohibited in the fiscal year 1984 appropria
tions act were to be permanently removed from leasing, approximately
2.24 billion barrels of oil would be foregone. 332 This production could
have replaced domestic oil and gas reserves which are rapidly being
depleted. The proved oil and natural gas reserves of the United States
have declined by 30% since 1970. 333 More than 75% percent of the
oil the nation will require in the year 2000 must still be discovered. By
1994, the United States must find thirty-two billion barrels of domestic
oil just to replace the oil the nation is depleting. 334 To maintain the
current level of domestic reserves and production, the United States
will need to find nine million barrels of oil and fifty-five billion cubic
feet of natural gas each day.335
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States,
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.).
330. Hearing on DeS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 336 (statement of Atlantic
Richfield Co. on Moratoria Affecting Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS).
331. Hearing on the Five- Year oes Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 25; Hearings
on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 120 (statement of Dan Chappell, Div.
Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States, Amoco Prod. Co.,
on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.).
332. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 8 (statement of Representative
John Breaux of Louisiana).
333. Hearings on DeS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 118 (statement of
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States,
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.). The rapid depletion of domestic
reserves is illustrated by the fact that 68% of the oil and gas reserves in the Louisiana OCS
are now depleted. Hearing on DeS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 194 (statement of
Philip J. Burguieres, President & Chief Operating Officer, Cameron Iron Works, on behalf
of the Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n).
334. Hearing on oes Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 194 (statement of Philip J.
Burguieres, President & Chief Operating Officer, Cameron Iron Works, on behalf of the
Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n).
335. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 118 (statement of
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United ·States,
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.).
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If the United States is to avoid further declines in domestic pro
duction, oil and gas exploration must be allowed in the most promis
ing offshore areas. 336 As much as half of this country's future oil and
gas production is estimated to come from offshore areas. Nonetheless,
the United States has leased and explored less of its OCS than most of
the other major industrial nations of the world. Since federal OCS
leasing began in 1954, only 4% of the OCS has b~en leased for oil and
gas exploration, only 2% is currently under lease, and only 1% is pro
ducing oil or gas. 337 In contrast, since 1964, the United Kingdom has
leased 66 million offshore acres, 41 % of its continental shelf. The
United Kingdom is self-sufficient in oil production and currently ex
ports petroleum to the United States. Canada has leased 900 million
acres since 1964, nearly one-third of its 2.8 billion acre continental
shelf. 338
In contrast to our allies, the United States now imposes leasing
moratoria on promising OCS acreage while continuing to import more
than one-third of the oil it uses. Imports accounted for more than
42% of 1988 demand, a level that is higher than at the start of the
1973-74 Arab oil embargo. It is estimated that imported oil could ac
count for more than one-half of total United States demand by 1990
and for more than two-thirds by the year 2000. 339 Events in the Mid
dle East, including the Iran-Iraq war, show how a sudden disruption
to oil supplies could result due to trouble in the Persian Gulf area.
Many of this country's allies and trading partners are dependent on
Persian Gulf oil, and any sudden disruption would threaten United
States oil and_allied economic and political well-being. 340 Oil and nat
336. House Hearings on the 1986 Dep't o/the Interior Appropriations-Part 5, supra
note 136, at 204 (statement of Robert E. Harris, President & Chief Executive Officer of
Nat'l Supply Co.).
337. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 119 (statement of
Dan Chappell, Div. Exploration Manager for Offshore Texas and East Coast United States,
Amoco Prod. Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.).
338. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 319 (statement of William C.
O'Malley, President, Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., on behalf of Int'l Ass'n of Drilling
Contractors).
.
339. Id. at 229 (statement of c.B. Wheeler, Senior Vice President for Exploration,
Exxon Co., U.S.A., on behalf of Am. Petroleum Inst.); Department 0/ the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations/or 1989-Part 12: Hearings Be/ore the Subcomm. on the
Department 0/ the Interior and Related Agencies 0/ the House Comm. on Appropriations,
lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 501 [hereinafter House Hearings on the 1989 DOl Appropriations
Part 12] (statement of Representative Lindy Boggs of Louisiana).
340. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 236 (statement of James D.
Henry, Vice President, ARCO Exploration Co.); Hearing on OCS Leasing 4ctivities, supra
note 102, at 194-95 (statement of Philip J. Burguieres, President and Chief Operating Of
ficer, Cameron Iron Works, on behalf of the Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n).
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ural gas provide for over two-thirds of all the energy used in the
United States, and all indications suggest that they will continue to be
the nation's chief energy sources in the foreseeable future. It takes
many years to discover and produce new OCS oil and gas supplies.
Leasing moratoria not only delay the search for new hydrocarbon sup
plies now, but will delay production in the 1990's and beyond, when
the need for domestic oil and gas is likely to be far more urgent than it
is today.341

Opponents of leasing moratoria also argue that the United States
cannot afford the economic costs that moratoria inflict on today's
economy in terms of lost federal revenues and employment opportuni
ties. Revenue from the OCS leasing program is the second largest con
tributor to the federal treasury.342 OCS bonuses, rentals, and royalties
provided over $87 billion to the federal government in cumulative rev
enue from 1953 through 1987. 343 If the 1984 fiscal year moratoria
became permanent, it is estimated that approximately 3.5 billion bo
nus dollars would be lost and net economic value losses would total
$8.8 billion. 344 In today's economy, it is difficult to justify congres
sionalleasing moratoria that deny the United States revenue from this
established source of funds. 345
The benefits of the OCS leasing program extend beyond revenues
to the federal government and a more secure petroleum supply for the
nation. Studies analyzing the contribution of OCS activities to the
United States economy found that in 1981 OCS activities generated
more than 700,000 jobs, $25 billion in expenditures and nearly 1% of
this nation's total economic output. A total ban on OCS leasing off
California would negatively affect a wide variety of United States in
dustries and would be felt in virtually all fifty states. Inland states
which supply a large portion of the industrial goods that support off
shore petroleum operations would be particularly affected. Five of
those states-Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
would lose approximately 35,000 jobs associated with OCS
341. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 229 (statement of c.B. Wheeler,
Senior Vice President for Exploration, Exxon Co., U.S.A., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum
Inst.).
342. Id. at 17 (statement of Representative Solomon P. Ortiz of Texas).
343. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 73.
344. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 8 (statement of Representative
John Breaux of Louisiana).
345. Id. at 237 (statement of James D. Henry, Vice President of Finance and Plan
ning, ARCO Exploration Co.). See also Id. at 17 (statement of Representative Solomon P.
Ortiz of Texas).
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activities.346
The moratoria are also having a negative impact on employment
opportunities, particularly within the oilfield industry.347 An analysis
of the effects of the leasing moratoria by the DOl for fiscal year 1984
reported that in the California OCS region, 2,085 jobs were lost. 348
The relationship between offshore exploration activity and employ
ment is particularly strong in the Gulf States. 349 Offshore activity in
1984 supported approximately 10,000 jobs in Texas. 35o A 1984 study
prepared by the Texas Department of Water Resources found that one
new job in the oil and gas industries creates 3.7 new jobs in other
sectors of the Texas economy.351
The offshore industry also cites its environmental safety record as
an additional reason why current leasing moratoria should be lifted. 352
From 1954 to 1987, a total of 26,791 wells were drilled in the federal
OCS.353 Despite all of this activity, only one significant oil well blow
out has occurred, resulting in the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. 354
Studies have shown that the environmental damage was temporary
and that the area suffered no long-term adverse environmental. ef
fects.355 The contribution of OCS exploration and production activi
ties to total oil spilled in United States waters has been insignificant
346. House Hearings on the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 6, supra note 301, at
320-21 (statement of Richard L. Ranger, Dist. Land Manager, Arco Oil and Gas Co., on
behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst. and the Western Oil and Gas Ass'n).
347. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 189-90 (statement of
Philip J. Burguieres, President and Chief Operating Officer, Cameron Iron Works, on be
half of the Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n).
348. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 38-39 (statement of Representa
tive Jack Fields of Texas).
349. ld. at 4; House Hearings on the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 12, supra note
339, at 500 (statement of Representative Lindy Boggs of Louisiana).
350. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 4 (statement of Representative
Jack Fields of Texas).
351. ld.
352. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 340 (statement of Atlantic
Richfield Co. on Moratoria Affecting Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS); House Hearings on
the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 6, supra note 301, at 315-16 (statement of Richard L.
Ranger, Dist. Land Manager, Arco Oil and Gas Co., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.
and the Western Oil & Gas Ass'n); OCS Moratoriums are Reactions to Past Circumstances,
Not Current Problems, Oil & Gas J., July I, 1985, at 17; Congress Subverts its Own OCS
Development Mandate by Denying Funds for Lease Sales, supra note 323, at 39.
353. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 31.
354. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 180-82 (statement of Max
G. Pitcher, Vice President, N. Am. Exploration, Conoco, Inc., on behalf of the Am. Petro
leum Inst.).
355. ld. at 181.
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and exaggerated. 356 Ironically, by enacting lease moratoria, Congress
is promoting not only increased dependence on foreign oil, but is en
couraging the transportation of oil on tankers which are far more dan
gerous to the marine environment than OCS activities. 357
In addition, opponents of leasing moratoria point out that OCS
activities do not have an adverse impact on the nation's sport and
commercial fisheries. 358 Since 1954, over 90% of the oil and gas pro
duced in the federal OCS has come from the Gulf states of Louisiana
and Texas. The commercial harvest of fish and shellfish has actually
increased in the Gulf of Mexico. 359
Finally, the DOl argues that the moratoria imposed by appropri
ations committees arbitrarily circumvent the objectives of the OC
SLAA.36O The 1978 amendments clearly provide that a primary
purpose of the OCS leasing process is the "expedited exploration and
development of the Outer Continental Shelf in order to achieve na
tional economic and energy policy goals, assure national security, re
duce dependence on foreign sources, and maintain a favorable balance
of payments in world trade."361 In addition, in compliance with sec
tion 18 of OCSLAA, the DOl's five-year leasing program is designed
to develop a balanced approach for sharing the "developmental bene
fits and environmental risks among the various regions."362 Leasing
moratoria are inconsistent with both of these objectives. They prohibit
development of domestic reserves and preclude the balancing man
dated by the OCSLAA by upsetting the regional distribution of devel
opment. 363 To date, 97% of the wells drilled in the federal OCS are
located in the Gulf of Mexico. In contrast, oil and gas leasing is pro
hibited in approximately 85% of the California OCS.364
356. Hearings on DeS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 284-86 (statement of James D.
Henry, Vice President, Arco Exploration Co.).
357. Id. at 4 (statement of Representative Jack Fields of Texas).
358. [d. at 248, 288-89 (statement of Atlantic Richfield Co.); Hearing on DeS Activi
ties, supra note 102, at 182 (statement of Max G. Pitcher, Vice President, N. Am. Explora
tion, Conoco, Inc., on behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst.).
359. Hearings on DeS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 6 (statement of Representative
Robert L. Livingston of Louisiana). The increase in the commercial harvest of fish and
shellfish in the Gulf of Mexico is the result of more effort and of harvesting of new species.
Id. at 248 (statement of Atlantic Richfield Co.).
360. Id. at 46 (statement of Garrey E. Carruthers, Assistant Secretary, Land & Min
erals Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
361. 43 U.S.C. § 1802(1) (1982).
362. Id. § 1344(a)(2)(B).
363. Hearings on DeS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 46 (statement of Garrey E. Car
ruthers, Assistant Secretary, Land & Minerals Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
364. Hearing on DeS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 191-92 (statement of
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Congressionally imposed leasing moratoria are in fact bad public
policy. Any government action that adversely affects the timely devel
opment of OCS energy resources will have a significant impact on this
nation's energy security and economy, both today and in the future. 365
Congressional moratoria in appropriations bills .are an unsound ap
proach to formulating a national OCS leasing policy. They circum
vent the detailed consultation procedures prescribed by Congress in
the OCSLAA for both the development of the five-year program and
the sale-specific leasing process. 366 There are numerous statutes pres
ently in effect designed to define and promote balanced OCS energy
development, including the OCSLAA, the Coastal Zone Management
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. Leasing moratoria
eliminate this balance by precluding even the possibility of energy ex
ploration and production in areas with significant oil and gas
reserves.367 Leasing moratoria cannot be reconciled with these
statutes.
It is clearly important that the federal offshore leasing program be
conducted in an environmentally safe manner. Also, it is important to
remember that the hydrocarbon resources underlying the federal OCS
belong to all citizens of the United States. They are not the exclusive
possessions of the adjoining coastal states, and the development of
these resources is not a matter that concerns only one state or only one
group of states. The OCSLAA clearly provides that when vital deci
sions must be made concerning OCS leasing policy, it is the national
interest that must prevail. Continued delay in leasing federal offshore
lands is not in the national interest. The development of OCS energy
resources is important to the future of United States citizens.368
IV.

EVALUATING SECRETARY WATT'S IMPLEMENTATION OF
AREAWIDE LEASING

A major policy consideration of the OCS program is the rate at
which offshore resources are made available for private developPhilip J. Burguieres, President and Chief Operating Officer, Cameron Iron Works, on be
half of the Nat'l Ocean Indus. Ass'n).
365. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 46 (statement of Garrey E. Car
ruthers, Assistant Secretary, Land & Minerals Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
366. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 13 (statement of
Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior).
367. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 19 (statement of Representative
Norman D. Shumway of California).
368. House Hearings on the 1989 DOl Appropriations-Part 6, supra note 301, at
316,322 (statement of Richard L. Ranger, Dist. Land Manager, Arco Oil and Gas Co., on
behalf of the Am. Petroleum Inst. and the Western Oil and Gas Ass'n).
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ment. 369 FormerSecretary Watt's decision to increase the oes acre
age leased annually was based on six goals of the Reagan
administration: (1) to increase domestic production on the oes and
lessen the nation's reliance on foreign energy supplies; (2) to expand
the amount of acreage leased; (3) to inventory the resources of the
oes; (4) to boost the economy; (5) to create market-oriented condi
tions for offshore production; and (6) to continue protection of the
environment. 370
A major goal of Secretary Watt's oes program was to increase
domestic production and to decrease the nation's dependence on for
eign oil. 371 The Secretary's program, however, has had little or no
effect on the domestic production of oes oil and gas and has not less
ened United States reliance on foreign oil.3 72 Production of hydrocar
bon resources from the federal' oes has remained fairly constant,
rising from 9.3% of domestic oil production in 1981 to only 12.1 % in
1987. Natural gas production has also remained relatively constant,
growing slightly from 24% to 26% of the total United States produc
tion in those respective years. 373 Furthermore, United States depen
dence on foreign oil has increased from approximately 34% of total
consumption in 1981 to 42% of total consumption in 1988. Particu
larly worrisome is the fact that since 1986, approximately 90% of the
increase in United States oil imports has come from OPEC sources,
primarily Middle East countries. 374
Two additional key objectives of the Watt program were to ex
pand the amount of acreage leased and to inventory the nation's oes
energy resources. 375 The oil industry now holds leases on more than
26 million acres of the oes, 22.3 million in the Gulf of Mexico
alone. 376 However, much of this has yet to be drilled. 377 Results of
areawide lease sales held since 1983 indicate that an increased amount
of acreage has been leased. In 1984, a record 7.5 million acres were
369.

370.

OCS SALE 35, supra note 223, at 15:

oes Oversight Hearings-Part2, supra note

I, at 49-55 (statement of James G.

Watt, Secretary of the Interior).

371. Id.
372. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 55.
373. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 85.
374. Hamilton, u.s. Oil Output Drops to 24-Year Low, Washington Post, Jan. 19,
1989, at A13, col. 2.
375. oes Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 55 (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior).
376. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 13.
377. Hearings on oes Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 457 (statement of
Patricia E. Hughes, OCS Coordinator, Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Office).
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leased. 378 However, much of this increase has been limited to the Gulf
of Mexico. 379 Starting with the advent of areawide leasing in 1983
through 1986, leases have been awarded for approximately 18.2 mil
lion acres in the Gulf of Mexico region. 380 In contrast, only 3.6 mil
lion acres have been leased in the Alaska, Atlantic, and Pacific OCS
regions.38 I Similarly, from 1954 through 1986, 26,019 wells were
drilled in the federal OCS.382 The majority of these-24,983-were
drilled in the Gulf of Mexico. Wells drilled in the Alaska, Atlantic,
and Pacific regions totaled only 1,036. 383 From 1983 through 1986,
3,733 wells were drilled in the Gulf of Mexico. In contrast, only 191
wells were drilled in the remaining United States OCS regions. 384 It
appears, therefore, that Secretary Watt's program has encouraged
more leasing of OCS acreage but has not increased the rate of OCS
exploration, with the exception of the Gulf of Mexico. 385
Secretary Watt repeatedly claimed that his program was an inte
gral part of President Reagan's economic recovery package386 and
would increase treasury revenues. 387 There is no question that the
Watt program's increased size and pace of lease offerings resulted in
more annual revenues to the federal treasury than in past years. 388
Total bonuses paid for leases for the 1981-86 period were approxi
mately $22.2 billion. In contrast, bonuses paid for leases from the be
ginning of the federal OCS program in 1954 through 1980 totalled
only $30.8 billion. 389 There remain, however, serious concerns as to
whether these figures represent fair market value for the sale of public
resources.390
The need to generate revenues in order to reduce the federal
1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 12.
Vass, A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development During
the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations-Part II, 21 TULSA L.J. 225, 296-98 (1985)
[hereinafter Vass II].
380. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 10.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 31.
378.
379.

383. Id.
384. Id. at 30-31.
385. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part 1, supra note 98, at 457 (statement of
Patricia E. Hughes, OCS Coordinator, Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Office).
386. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of James G.
Watt, Secretary of the Interior).
387. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 55.
388. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 124-25 (statement of Andrew
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).
389. 1987 FEDERAL OFFSHORE STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 12.
390. See supra notes 220-97 and accompanying text.
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budget deficit was a consideration in developing the accelerated OCS
leasing schedule. 391 The Office of Management and Budget en
couraged the DOl to pursue an aggressive OCS leasing program as 'an
important revenue enhancing measure,392 and DOl spokesmen have
acknowledged the contribution the OCS program makes in raising rev
enues for the Treasury.393 Richard Delaney, Assistant Secretary of
Environmental Affairs and Director of the Coastal Zone Management
Program in Massachusetts, has charged that the main goal ofthe Watt
OCS leasing plan was, in fact, to collect revenue to offset the federal
budget deficit. 394
Although it produced increased revenues, Secretary Watt's pro
gram did not promote competitive market conditions for OCS produc
tion. In fact, the opposite occurred. Large acreage offerings and the
increased sale frequency produced conditions in which an economi
cally competitive market did not exist. 395
Secretary Watt also failed to take measures ensuring the contin
ued protection of the environment. As noted previously, at the same
time the DOl was rapidly accelerating OCS oil and gas leasing, the
Reagan administration proposed the elimination of federal funding for
state implementation of the Coastal Zone Management Program, the
Coastal Energy Impact Program, and the National Sea Grant Pro
gram. These programs provide federal funding which is used to miti
gate the adverse impact of coastal energy development. 396
The apparent guiding philosophy behind Secretary Watt's OCS
program was to lease as much of the OCS as possible, with little con
391. Hearing on the Five-Year OCS Leasing Schedule, supra note 4, at 2-3; OCS
Oversight Hearings-Part 1, supra note 36, at 316; PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED
OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 55, at 23; Jennrich, u.s. Oilmen Supporting Reagan,
but Some Fear Broken Promises, Oil & Gas J., Oct. II, 1982, at 57-58. Secretary Watt's
program was not the first time that the OCS program has been used to generate revenues
for the federal government. In the 1970's, "the needs of the Bureau of Budget [now the
OMB] dictated when and where to lease. The Shelf oil and gas-leasing program was heav
ily influenced by the desire to generate revenues for the [federal] Treasury." COMPTROL
LER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RED-75-343, REPORT TO
CONGRESS: OUTLOOK FOR FEDERAL GOALS TO ACCELERATE LEASING OF OIL &. GAS
RESOURCES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 6 (1975) [hereinafter OUTLOOK FOR
ACCELERATING OCS LEASING].
392. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 3, supra note 88, at 22. See also Palmer & Kelly,
Government Praised for Policy Changes, OFFSHORE, June 20, 1983, at 35, 38.
393. OCS Oversight Hearings-Part 2, supra note I, at 96 (statement of J. Robinson
West, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Budget & Admin., U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
394. Hearings on OCS Lease Sales-Part 2, supra note 208, at 324 (statement of
Richard Delaney, Chairman, New England/New York Coastal Zone Task Force).
395. See supra notes 227-46 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
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cern for the revenue impact of flooding the market with tract offerings
and with no assurance about when oil and gas would be produced or
whether state and local governments could effectively plan for acceler
ated offshore ·development. 397 The results of this decision demonstrate
the effects of operating a leasing program based on such a philosophy.
Leasing the federal OCS to industry faster than is practicable has
made it difficult to plan for environmental protection,398 assess the
value of OCS resources,399 and promote economic competition. 400
This situation has contributed to uncertainty about the value of OCS
resources, has encouraged private speculation in these resources, and
has caused industry to allocate scarce capital on lands with little or no
resource potentia1. 401 As a result, Secretary Watt's program resulted
in less revenue for the Treasury than would have been received if the
slower pace of the prior tract-selection process had been followed. 402
Secretary Watt's justification for accelerated leasing was based on
the flawed assumption that making large amounts of offshore acreage
available for lease would stimulate increased production of OCS oil
and gas.403 In fact, the production of hydrocarbon reserves is far more
dependent upon the prevailing economics of exploration and develop
ment than on the number of leases distributed. 404 Market forces con
strain the economic viability of development of OCS leases. The
current world-wide excess of petroleum production capacity, the con
tinuing depressed demand for petroleum, and the rising costs of devel
oping a lease into a producing unit limit the development of OCS
reserves. These conditions make investment in developing new hydro
carbon reserves a risky venture and are more important factors in in
dustry decision making than the availability of large numbers of lease
397. OCS SALE 35, supra note 223, at 16.
398. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 150 (statement of Sarah Chasis,
Senior Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.).
399. Id. at 124-30 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Pub
lic Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).
400. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 18-21.
401. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 124-30 (statement of Andrew
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.); OCS SALE
35, supra note 223, at 33.
402. EARLY AsSESSMENT OF DOl's AREAWIDE LEASING PROGRAM, supra note 96,
at 18.
403. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WAlT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 55; Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 127 (statement of Andrew
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).
404. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 127-28 (statement of Andrew
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).
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offerings. 40s The transfer of large amounts of scarce industry capital
to the federal government in the form of bonuses paid for leases may
have diverted needed financing from exploration budgets and may
have actually caused companies to defer development of OCS
tracts.406 For example, while the number of producing leases has
steadily risen during the Reagan administration, the ratio between
non-producing and producing leases has also risen, indicating that the
Watt program has been a successful lease acquisition program, but
that industry has deferred developing the leases it has acquired.407 In
sum, the Watt leasing policies have been constrained by the price of oil
because development of OCS gas and oil will proceed no faster than
market forces will allow.
Areawide leasing is a workable concept. A concept similar to
areawide leasing is used in most other countries, including Great Brit
ain and Norway.408 The major issues in any offshore leasing policy are
how the government, as owner of public resources, determines which
areas contain the most promising geologic structures for hydrocarbons
and are most likely to be of interest to industry, and how it decides
which areas should be deleted from lease offerings because their
unique resources could be adversely affected by OCS development ac
tivities.409 Areawide leasing as implemented by Watt's DOl per
formed neither of these tasks well. The DOl essentially abdicated
decisions. on selecting the most promising acreage to industry and
waited until the last step in the process, the sale, to find out which
areas were the most promising. The DOl placed the burden of dem
onstrating that certain areas should be deleted from lease offerings on
the states and other interested parties. The basic presumption was
that the entire planning area would be offered in a sale unless the DOl
was pressured to delete an area. 4 \O
The Watt OCS program was hastily developed and did not ade
405. Id.; Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 409 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Di
rector, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).
406. Hearings on OCS Moratoria, supra note 298, at 128 (statement of Andrew
Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).
407. Id.
408. Vass II, supra note 379, at 306-08. The rapid development of the North Sea is
largely attributed to the British policy of offering and licensing vast amounts of OCS acre
age. British blocks are more than 10 times as large as United States tracts, and Norwegian
blocks are about 20 times as large. Id. at 306.
409. Hearings on OCS Leasing Process-Part J, supra note 98, at 491 (statement of
Charles S. Colgan, Director, Policy Div., Maine State Planning Office).
410. Id.
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quately address the concerns of coastal states and interested parties.
The Comptroller General reviewed the Watt program and concluded:
[R]edesign of the leasing program appears to have been done within
Interior with little or no input from other Federal agencies and only
minor consideration of input from the public sector. The riew pro
gram reflects the Administration's policy decision to accelerate min
eralleasing more than it reflects the comments received through the
public participation and review process .... 411

The DOl conducted few studies assessing the potential impact of
the new OCS program. 412 In particular, the DOl did not evaluate the
program's potential impact with respect to: (1) industry competition
and small company participation in OCS lease sales; (2) the ability of
state and local governments to participate in OCS decision making; (3)
the use and impact of alternative bidding systems; (4) longterm reve
nues to the federal government; and (5) the impact on the economy.413
The goals of the Watt program might have been accomplished by
amending the OCSLAA to broaden the DOl's authority in the leasing
process. This approach was neither proposed nor considered. Instead,
Secretary Watt radically altered the OCS program on the basis of the
discretion that the OCSLAA already delegated to the Secretary. His
unilateral action, however, was hindered by the lack of a bipartisan
consensus that an amended OCSLAA would have provided. 414
411. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 28. See also GAO: DeS Leasing Plan is Too Much, Oil & Gas J., Jan. 11, 1982, at 44
45.
Previous attempts by the DOl to accelerate OCS leasing displayed similar planning
flaws. The Comptroller General characterized DOl's 1974 plan to lease 10 million OCS
acres as "the most critical policy decision in the 20-year history of Federal Shelf leasing;
one which deserved careful analysis and considerations." OUTLOOK FOR ACCELERATING
OCS LEASING, supra note 391, at 4. When the Comptroller General analyzed the 1974
plan, he found that the proposal was:
[1] hastily conceived by Interior under pressures exerted by the presence of the
energy crisis and fears that the newly formed FEA would assume responsibility
for the Shelf leasing program;
[2] developed with little input by the operating levels of BLM and [USGS] and
based on overly optimistic assumptions and inadequate data;
[3] adopted by Interior policy officials despite opposition from program person
nel in BLM and [USGS]; and
[4] developed and adopted without considering environmental impacts, na
tional-regional supply-and-demand needs, or alternatives to large-scale expansion
of Shelf leasing.
Id.
412. PITFALLS IN INTERIOR'S ACCELERATED OCS LEASING PROGRAM, supra note
55, at 47.
413. Id. at 38, 47-48.
414. Vass I, supra note 35, at 60-6t:

72

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12: 1

During the development of his program and during individual
lease sales held under his supervision, Secretary Watt did only the bare
minimum required under the OCSLAA to allow for state participa
tion.415 He did not follow the spirit and intent of the OCSLAA.416 By
observing only the letter of OCSLAA, Secretary Watt fostered an at
mosphere of confrontation with the states and other interested parties
that served only to delay further an already lengthy process of leasing
OCS lands. 417 Secretary Watt's policy of brinksmanship in dealing
with the coastal states and other interested parties, by refusing to de
lete environmentally sensitive tracts from lease offerings, forced them
to initiate litigation to enjoin the sales. 418 The policy resulted in leas
ing moratoria advocated by groups concerned about particular coastal
areas. 419
A direct consequence of state frustration with the Watt program
was unprecedented litigation. In the first two years of the Watt pro
gram, eight of the fifteen scheduled lease sales were challenged on en
vironmental grounds. In comparison, in the four years prior to the
adoption of the Watt leasing program, only five lawsuits on environ
mental grounds were filed against the twenty lease sales scheduled. 420
Secretary Watt's program resulted in major delays from litigation and
confrontation rather than accelerating the leasing of OCS lands as en
visioned by the Reagan administration. 421 In fact, a more modest pro
415. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1385 (C.D. Ca. 1981), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Secretary of Interior v. Califor
nia, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING
PLAN, supra note 4, at 36.
416. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. at 1385-86; HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY
WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.
417. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 42. Secretary Watt failed to properly interpret the requirements of section 18 of
the OCSLAA and to involve the states in meaningful participation in the OCS decision
making process. Id. at 47. A report by the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs stated: "Secretary Watt is not allaying the fears and concerns of groups affected by
his program. Instead, he has been obstinate and unyielding, and has seemed to encourage a
fight with his critics." Id. at 47-48.
418. Id. at 44; Hearings on OCS, supra note 99, at 407 (statement of Andrew Palmer,
Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).
419. See supra notes 304-68 and accompanying text.
420. Hearing on OCS Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 249 (statement of Sarah
Chasis, Senior Staff Attorney and Lisa Speer, Resource Specialist, Natural Resources De
fense Council, Inc.). DOl policies under the Reagan administration encouraged confronta
tion with state and local governments and citizen groups. In 1984, there were over 4,000
lawsuits pending in the nation's courts that challenged 001 policies. Clark Planning to
Fine Tune Five-Year OCS Lease Sale Schedule, Oil & Gas J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 62.
421. HOUSE REP. ON SECRETARY WATT'S FIVE-YEAR OCS LEASING PLAN, supra
note 4, at 1-2, 47-49; Texas v. Secretary of Interior, 580 F. Supp. 1197, 1202 (E.D. Tex.
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gram that focused on the most promising geologic structures in
planning areas would have produced a more rational and less contro
versialleasing program. Such a program would have met the national
needs and would have assured compliance with both the letter and the
spirit of the OCSLAA. 422
CONCLUSION

The controversy surrounding former Secretary Watt, including
the OCS program, eventually led to his resignation and the appoint
ment of President Reagan's close friend William Clark as Secretary of
the Interior. 423 While Secretary Clark increased efforts to consider the
views of coastal states and interested citizens in OCS issues, there was
no significant change in the Watt policies. Secretary Clark continued
to implement an accelerated schedule of OCS lease sales and areawide
leasing. The administration maintained its opposition to funding fed
eral programs that would help states plan for the impacts of OCS de
velopment activities. Thus, the controversy over OCS lease sales
continued. 424

1984) ("more commonly, states employed litigation as a means for delaying OCS develop
ment: By increasing risks and raising doubts in potential lessees' minds, the mere threat of
litigation retarded federal efforts to extend OCS leasing. In sum, continuing federal-state
conflict arrested expansion of OCS development. ") For example, Arco forfeited a $30 mil
lion investment by abandoning a leased area considered to be one of the best potentials of
California's offshore because it did not want to risk further litigation. Hearing on oes
Leasing Activities, supra note 102, at 71 (statement of William D. Clark, Secretary of the
Interior).
422. Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at 409 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director,
Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).
423. Watt's Resignation: An Opportunity to Further Improve u.s. Land Policies, Oil
& Gas J., Oct. 17, 1983, at 43. The OCS program was one of the most controversial pro
grams initiated by former Secretary Watt. The plan was referred to as "radical, irresponsi
ble, extremist, and wasteful." Senate Hearings on the Five-Year oes Leasing Plan, supra
note 34, at 7 (statement of Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum of Ohio). In a national survey
conducted by a major news magazine to rank the competence and effectiveness of President
Reagan's cabinet officers, Secretary Watt was identified as "the most politically controver
sial of the group." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 27, 1981, at 14. For additional edito
rial comment by the mass media on James Watt's Interior policies, see NEWSWEEK, June
29, 1981, at 22-23; THE NEW YORKER, May 4, 1981, at 104.
424. Hearings on oes Moratoria, supra note 298, at 24 (statement of Arthur J. Roc
que, Jr., Chairman of the Coastal States Organization); Hearings on oes, supra note 99, at
397-98 (statement of Lisa Speer, Senior Project Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Coun
cil, Inc.), at 407 (statement of Andrew Palmer, Director, Oceans, Coasts and Public Lands
Project, Envtl. Policy Inst.).

